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Abstract 
This paper outlines a dynamic, medium/long term Innovation 
and Technology Policy framework for industrializing economies 
directed to simulate innovation and to contribute to the eventual 
creation of high impact innovative entrepreneurial clusters. The paper 
is predicated on the assumption that while cluster creation policies are 
possible in many contexts they requires adoption of a System 
Evolutionary (S/E) perspective to Innovation and Technology Policy. 
Given the current ’entrepreneurial phase’ of the ICT Revolution, 
support of ‘Innovative SMEs’ should be one of the axes of an overall 
strategy of development for a large group of industrializing economies. 
The three phase policy model proposed here starts with direct 
Government support, including Horizontal support to Business Sector 
R&D/Innovation and/or to innovative Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprise or Start Ups (Phase 1); and culminates with implementation 
of Targeted or other policies in support of Venture Capital (VC)/ 
Private Equity (PE) and possibly of other industries. Between these 
two central policy thrusts an intermediate phase 2 would be 
implemented with the objective of reinforcing innovation and creating 
other favorable conditions, including favourable ‘demand’ conditions 
and enhanced policy capabilities, for a successful transition to Phase 3. 
The model is a generic model which allows for different variants 
reflecting different country contexts, although, throughout, it will 
emphasize the importance of direct Business Sector support 
mechanisms at least during Phases 1 and 2. The structure of the policy 
portfolio will depend on country characteristics and specific
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institutions; and  its changes over time will also reflect in part differences in the policy objectives 
from phase to phase. 
       As it stands the framework is neither ‘formal’ nor ‘appreciative theory’ that is theory 
which closely follows the facts. This is the result of the paucity of data and the impossibility of 
undertaking at this stage a cross-country comparative analysis of policy cycles. Still the model as it 
stands can provide useful pointers to policymakers in a variety of contexts. 
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1. Background and Objectives 
This paper outlines a medium/long term ITP effort in 
industrializing economies directed to simulate innovation and to 
contribute to the eventual creation of high-impact, innovation-intensive 
clusters. The three phase policy model proposed here starts with direct 
Government support, including Horizontal support to Business Sector 
(BS) R&D/Innovation and/or to innovative Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprise (SME) or Start Ups (SU, Phase 1); and culminates with 
implementation of Targeted or other policies in support of Venture 
Capital (VC)/ Private Equity (PE) industries. The latter are part of a 
broader strategy in Phase 3 of creating or re-configuring innovative 
clusters in industrializing economies. Between these two central policy 
thrusts an intermediate phase 2 would be implemented with the 
objective of reinforcing Innovation and creation of other favorable 
conditions, including enhanced policy capabilities, for a successful 
transition to Phase 3.1 In this latter phase the economy would 
experience an acceleration of innovation and, depending on context, of 
R&D; and in some very successful cases countries which a generation 
or two ago had low incomes per capita would attain R&D/GNP ratios 
of over 2%. The model refers only to one specific innovative SME 
oriented plan of action out of a Multi-Pronged Strategy for innovation-
based Economic Development involving other components not 
considered in this paper. Thus, frequently and in parallel to the three 
phase model presented here, a different set of policies directed to 
(existing) large companies, would have to be implemented. 
                                                     
1 For the definition of VC and PE see 1.1.3 below. There are other PE-based support systems for innovative SMEs e.g. Investment 
Companies.  
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Throughout, Innovation is being defined within a broad, Schumpeterian perspective.which includes 
but goes beyond that resulting from formal R&D activities. 
The model is a generic model which allows for different variants reflecting different country 
contexts, although, throughout, it will emphasize the importance of direct BS support mechanism at 
least during Phases 1 and 2.2 The structure of a country’s policy portfolio will depend on its 
characteristics and specific institutions. Changes over time will reflect in part differences in the 
policy objectives from phase to phase; while differences in policy portfolios across countries will 
reflect inter-country differences in the combination of direct and indirect support (see below) of 
innovative SMEs during Phases 1 and 2, as well as in the mix of Phase 3 targeted policies. Thus in 
Phases 1 and 2 there may be country differences concerning programs in support of scientific 
research and University training etc.; while in Phase 3 countries would either implement targeted 
VC/PE policies only or these together with other cluster creation policies. Other policy portfolio 
differences refer to the mix of programs (e.g. horizontal versus targeted); the function or functions 
being supported (e.g. technology transfer, learning or R&D for phase 1); and the instrument(s) 
applied (e.g. subsidies, loans, tax benefits, etc.).  
Support of specific activities or functions of individual firms represent a direct form of 
Government intervention in support of innovation and innovative SME’s in the BS. Innovative 
SMEs should be linked to the concept of Knowledge Based Entrepreneurship (KBE) which is 
increasingly relevant for wide swathes of the SME business segment- both in low and mid tech 
industry, and in the software/IT and high tech industries.3 Direct measures contrast with indirect 
measures such as promotion of activities in organizations or institutions supporting the BS (e.g. 
Universities, Technology Centers, Government Laboratories) and promotion of VC and/or PE.4 
Direct support during Phases 1 and 2 should emphasize innovative SMEs; while policies during the 
third phase of the Model would explicitly include other, not exclusively SME oriented, cluster 
creating policies. 
The paper is predicated on the assumption that while cluster creation policies are possible in 
many contexts they requires adoption of a System Evolutionary (S/E) perspective to ITP (see next 
section). Previous work on clusters have emphasized the random nature of their particular 
geographical location (Florida and Kenney 1988) a fact which could be construed as implying, in 
accordance with the accepted view of policy makers, that cluster creation policies oriented to a 
particular location cannot succeed.5 We would like to note that in a similar vein of thought neither 
targeted VC policies nor targeted policies in general have been assumed to be possible.6 
Such conclusions contrast with previous work of ours on Israel’s VC industry which suggests 
that failure of VC policies frequently resulted both from not adopting a S/E perspective and for 
visualizing VC/PE as a ‘pool of money’ rather than an industry (Avnimelech and Teubal (A&T) 
                                                     
2 In some variants the model is consistent with and part of an Economic Development Catching-Up process based on a shift from  
Imitation to Innovation . Idem with respect to a transition to the Learning or KBE. 
3 KBE is a much broader concept than high tech entrepreneurship. It is linked to the increasing importance of knowledge, links and 
networks in all BS or segments: low tech, mid tech and high tech. Knowledge is broadly construed to include knowledge form 
outside the firm as well as from endogenous R&D or learning; tacit and/or codified knowledge; knowledge accessed through the 
market or through personal, professional or business links/ networks, etc. KBE is related to the concept of ‘knowledge operators’ 
whose function is both integration of existing knowledge and creation of new knowledge. It is linked to the creation of innovative 
SME and SU companies and to the activation of networks of existing companies. In our conception, VC is important to ‘trigger’ a 
Innovative Entrepreneurship (IE)-linked evolutionary process. Also, the creation of VC companies frequently reflects a process of IE. 
4 The distinction between direct and indirect (or system or infrastructural) support was originally made in Justman and Teubal 1986 
and subsequently by Lipsey and Carlaw 1997.It is also central in the conceptual model of transition of national SI presented in 
Teubal and Andersen 2001 where indirect measures would provide system level support to the restructuring of companies. VC/PE 
represent a private financial infrastructure to innovative SMEs/SU. 
5  This is also implied in Krugman’s work and in Bresnahan, Gambardella and Sexenian’s work on high tech clusters (Bresnahan et al 
2001). 
6  This because frequently VC-directed policies failed and because direct Government venture investments were supposed to crowd out 
private VC thereby hindering their development (OECD, 2000). J. Matthews (personal communication) has pointed out the case of 
Taiwan’s high tech cluster near Taipeh as a successful example of Government targeting.  
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2003b, 2004a,b; 2006a). Israel’s success of the 1990s pertained both to VC emergence and to high 
tech cluster emergence (or re- configuration). In that country VC emergence was the main vector of 
cluster dynamics (A&T 2006a,c). Similarly, it is our view that VC/PE emergence may play 
important roles in the dynamics of innovative clusters in general including cluster emergence. In 
line with this view we tentatively hypothesize that absence or failure of VC/PE policies might 
contribute to explain failure in cluster creation/re-configuration –not only with respect to high tech 
but more generally in connection with innovative SME-clusters–. 
1.1 Antecedents 
1.1.1 Globalization and the Need to Adapt  
Porter suggests that the process of Globalization, by generating global markets which in 
principle can be accessed by all agents, narrows the sources of Sustainable Competitive Advantages 
(SCA) of individual companies. In his opinion, this enhances the importance of clusters which (or 
particularly those which) contain idiosyncratic sets of resources. However, not any cluster will 
affectively provide indirect support to innovative companies, SMEs or sectors; in most cases 
existing clusters or agglomerations of companies would have to undergo significant restructuring. 
This view follows from another feature of globalization, namely the emergence of an increasingly 
harsh selection environment involving both high (expected) returns and high risk to 
invention/innovation/SU. This new environment is the result of global competition: while an 
innovator will in principle have access to the large global market he or she would also be subject to 
competition any time and originating from any one of a very large and increasing number of 
countries or regions. More specifically, we suggest that the development of VC, PE or other equity-
based ‘finance and support’ mechanisms to SU/innovative SMEs may be critical; although the 
Israeli experience suggests that the effective development of such private support systems could be 
a complex, multi-phase process-with conditions generated in early Phases (1 and 2) enabling or 
making it possible to develop VC/PE industries in Phase 3. Such conditions will include existence 
of an adequate number of entrepreneurs/innovative SMEs prior to targeting VC/PE.  
The harsh selection environment mentioned above is not unlike that facing Israel when it 
targeted a high-tech oriented VC industry during the early 1990s –25 years after implementing a 
direct BS R&D support program directed to individual companies–. This in part explains why that 
country’s experience with VC/PE targeting could be relevant in other contexts particularly when 
success in the new industry to be targeted depends on a) generating a critical mass of resources, 
both financial and other; b) accessing sophisticated world class foreign agents and linking them 
with domestic ones and c) triggering a sufficiently potent self-sustained process of industry 
‘emergence’. Understanding the Israeli experience required adoption of a multi-phase Industry Life 
Cycle (ILC) framework of analysis which emphasizes the critical transition points in the evolution 
of high tech and the institutions and mechanisms financing and supporting that industry (A&T 
2004a, 2003b). ITP played central roles not only in targeting VC but also in generating appropriate 
background and pre-conditions for a successful emergence process (A&T 2004a, 2005a,b; 2006b).7 
While our perspective is consistent with Porter’s there are important differences. While 
Porter states that under the new conditions SCA depends more than before on the clusters within 
                                                     
7  We also contend that given the dynamic and uncertain globalized environment mentioned above, the existence of sophisticated and 
even profitable domestic market forces operating prior to the emergence of the formal VC/PE industry or in related areas may 
actually enhance rather than diminish both the justification for implementing targeted policies and the probability that such policies 
will lead to industry emergence. On the face of it this would contradict both the theory of support of infant industries  
(where the prior existence of ‘strong’ market forces would seem to pre-empt the need for policy, see Stoneman, 1987); and the 
underpinnings of a simple ‘market failure’ justification for policy e.g. relevance of the “R&D additionality” criterion (see A&T, 
2005b). 
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which the firms are embedded, our paper emphasizes the potential relevance of a policy led and 
VC/PE led re-configuration of such clusters while emphasizing the pre-and background conditions 
which the BS or ‘old’ cluster (or agglomeration of firms) must fulfill before undergoing such a 
transformation.  
1.1.2 Evolutionary Life Cycle Models 
General 
The paper proposes a ‘Generic’ Life Cycle model for ITP oriented to the emergence of VC 
and to the emergence or reconfiguration of innovation-based and high tech clusters. Life Cycle 
analyses have increasingly been applied to new areas starting in the 1930’s with the analysis of 
trends in industry data e.g. sales. In the 1950s and 1960s several models in marketing were based on 
the life cycle concept. In part coinciding and in part following this work life cycle analysis was 
applied to patterns of international trade and investment (Vernon 1966); the evolution of firms and 
organizational learning (Kimberly and Miles, 1980; and Zollo and Winter, 2002); the introduction 
and diffusion of new products; and the evolution of new industries (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; 
Klepper 1996) including VC industries (A&T 2006a). Life Cycle analysis of ITP has barely begun.8 
Teubal and Andersen 
Teubal and Andersen 2001 suggested a model of BS and SI transformation which also 
comprises three phases and whose policy components are not so different from the three phases of 
our generic policy model. In both models the objective (more explicit in this paper) is enhanced 
innovation in the BS. The focus of Teubal and Andersen’s first phase is BS restructuring which 
comprises both an autonomous component (by ‘advanced’, though not necessarily largest, 
companies who are aware of the need to restructure) and a direct and horizontal support component. 
The second and third phase focus on indirect or infrastructural support leading to technological 
infrastructure9 (such as collective R&D performing organizations) and New Markets respectively. 
Direct support schemes would continue operating during these phases albeit with a changed focus 
e.g. oriented to ‘imitators’ and ‘laggard’ companies (including SMEs) respectively. The most 
important differences with our paper pertain to phases 2 and 3: while Teubal and Andersen focus on 
Technological Infrastructure and on the restructuring of existing companies, this paper gives 
prominence to new company formation/entrepreneurship and to VC (supply and demand of 
inventions/innovations) although the support of Technological Infrastructure (source of new 
invention/innovation opportunities) is also considered explicitly. Another important difference 
concerns targeted programs: they play a more important and explicit role in our work due to the 
centrality of VC/PE (not considered in Teubal and Andersen) and other cluster creation policies 
such as targeting specific industries in Phase 3. This also explains why, in contrast to Teubal and 
Andersen, we posit a phase (Phase 2) were business and policy experiments are conducted.10 
Avnimelech and Teubal 
We mentioned already that our paper is linked to previous work of ours (A&T 2004a,b,c; 
2003b) on the emergence of VC in Israel where a distinction was made between a ‘background 
conditions’ and a ‘pre-emergence’ phases on the one hand and a ‘VC emergence phase’ on the 
other. Success in VC emergence depends crucially on favorable conditions in the previous two 
phases. Our phase 2 is an extension of the ‘pre-emergence phase’ of that paper; but unlike it the 
experiments undertaken here are oriented to develop a capability to undertake targeted policies in 
                                                     
8  For an early Life Cycle model of Horizontal incentives’ policies in support of companies see Teubal 1997. Also for a life cycle 
analysis of Israel’s ITP see A&T 2004c. 
9  See Justman and Teubal 1997. 
10  Targeted policies are in general more complex than Horizontal policies (see below). In an evolutionary setting, experience with 
Horizontal policies may contribute to or set the basis for the subsequent implementation of Targeted policies (Teubal 1997, 2002). 
Our phase 2 will also include explicit efforts at creating ‘strategic’ ITP capabilities. 
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Phase 3 not only in connection with VC/PE but also for high tech sectors/technologies or other 
components of innovative clusters. This paper is also an extension and attempt at generalizing 
(beyond formal R&D, high tech and high tech oriented VC) the ITP Life Cycle Model as applied to 
Israeli experience of the last 35 years. A summary of that experience will be presented in Section 3. 
1.1.3 Venture Capital and its Role  
Definition of VC and PE 
VC companies are “independently managed dedicated pools of capital that focus on equity or 
equity-linked investments in privately held, high growth companies” (Lerner 1999, p. 349). This 
definition allows for two variants, a narrow and a broad one. The narrow or strict definition of VC  
–the relevant one for characterizing Israel’s VC industry– involves a ‘dominant’ orientation to the 
early stage finance of high tech SU companies; while the broad definition –relevant for the 
purposes of this paper– also allows for a non-high tech and non early phase focus. Note that even 
under the broad definition of VC the focus still lies on high growth companies which in our context 
would be a subset of innovative SMEs (including high tech SU whenever this is relevant). PE is 
even a broader category since it also (in addition to VC) allows for non-Venture equity investments 
(i.e. not related to high growth companies) especially in private companies such as leveraged buy-
outs and buy-ins, consolidations, mezzanine, distressed debt investments, etc.. Thus PE companies 
encompass both VC companies and other financial institutions whose dominant activity is late 
phase equity investments especially in non high tech industry and services. A common form of 
organization of VC is the Limited Partnership (LP) form, which is also common for PE whatever 
the definition used.11 
Traditional Roles of VC 
The traditional roles performed by VCs are: overcoming market failure associated with bank 
loans to SU companies; and also with respect to equity issues. A related role is providing Added 
Value to their ‘portfolio companies’. We briefly refer to each one of these. The specific VC 
literature (e.g. Gompers and Lerner 1999, 2001) emphasizes the market failures associated with 
bank loans to SU. These derive from: asymmetric information, high market uncertainty, frequently 
unknown entrepreneur, uncertain markets and the fact that most of the assets of SU are intangible. 
Banks as institutions are not fit in terms of orientation, capabilities and strategy to extend loans 
under these conditions; and if they did the interest rate would have to reflect the extremely high 
uncertainties surrounding SU activity. VCs overcome these failures through equity finance rather 
than loans (in fact, phased equity finance)  a fact that creates both an incentive and the feasibility 
(through board membership and control of the SU including replacing its CEO) to monitor and 
control entrepreneurs’ actions.12 
Some argue that VC plays a critical rule in the innovation process, not only as a source of 
finance to innovation but through other functions that lie at the core of high tech Development 
(Saxenian 1998, Florida 1987, Hellman 2000 and others). VC bridge between sources of finance, 
entrepreneurs, scientists, suppliers, and customers. According to Florida VCs are involved in four 
overlapping networks of agents related to the innovation process: financial institutions, 
                                                     
11  There seems to be no information of the scope of the venture component of PE which, given the strict definition of VC, should be 
defined as early equity finance of innovative SMEs in mid tech, low tech and services areas. The term ‘early’ is meant to emphasize 
that the ‘high growth’ SMEs financed are “young”. For high tech SU this means equity investments at the R&D or SU phase of such 
companies. 
12  Akerlof (1970) argues that asymmetric information can cause market failure in equity issues of young and risky firms. This will 
generally lead to Initial Public Offering (IPO) “underpricing’ which VCs can help overcome through a mechanism called ‘third party 
certification’. Third party certification has value whenever securities are being issued in capital markets where insiders of the issuing 
firm and the outside investors have different information sets concerning the value of the offering firm. The presence of VCs, as 
investors in a firm going public, reduces the under-pricing of an issue, reduces the underwriter spread charged by the investment 
banker handling the issue and increase the IPO valuation (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
Innovation and Technology Policy (ITP) for catching up … 
14 
entrepreneurs, professional business services, and professional labor market. Moreover, according 
to Florida the United States (US) VC industry played a critical rule in the innovation process in the 
US and is one of the reasons why US hi-tech has become the world leader during the late eighties  
and early nineties.  
VCs add value to their portfolio companies. From the literature and our interviews with 
Israeli VCs this is a result of Management assistance/ training, Strategic involvement, assistance in 
Marketing, Headhunting, and Certification. Management assistance/ training is required for those 
SU entrepreneurs who have little management experience; and there seems to be a consensus that 
lack of management skills is the most significant reason for SU failure. In some cases the VC have 
replaced managers or have they themselves on the temporary basis taken over this function.13 VCs 
typically also add value to their portfolio companies through assistance in strategic decisions. 
Sapienza, Manrgart and Vermeir (1996) found that VCs believe that their strategic involvement is 
their most important role in adding value to their portfolio companies. Assistance in marketing e.g 
introducing the SU to clients or to lead users for testing the product;14 and assistance in headhunting 
e.g. for a manager of a SU’s new subsidiary in the US, have both been recorded as important in the 
Israeli context during the 1990s. The certification function –where a reputable VC vouches for the 
quality and potential of an unknown SU– could also be central for SU success. It underlies part of 
the other adding value functions just mentioned, as well as VC help in facilitating SU to go public 
or go through a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) process.. 
VCs can add value to the innovative SMEs in their portfolio because of their Capabilities, 
Reputation and Networking. Sapienza et al op. cit found that VCs with experience in the portfolio 
companies’ industry generated more add value than VCs without such prior experience. Also VC 
capitalists with technology and entrepreneurial background generate more value added than VCs 
with financial background. VC reputation and close ties both with investment bankers and with hi-
tech corporations underlie their capacity to add value to portfolio companies through facilitating an 
IPO, product testing, marketing and other functions. In addition VCs have both the Motivation and 
the Power/Control to operate in this way. Motivation because equity based finance generates a 
strong alignment of incentives between the VCs and its portfolio companies: the more the SU 
thrives and grows the more the VC will earn. Power/Control-because VC-SU contracts generally 
give VCs a greater share of power than the share of ownership it acquires (Gilson, 2003).15 
Private Equity Support Systems and Industrializing economies 
The traditional adding value roles of VC/PE suggest that either these or other equity-based 
(generally private) finance and support organizations could play important roles in promoting 
innovative SMEs and clusters in industrializing economies. This is the reason why our Three Phase 
ITP model includes an explicit phase oriented to the development of VC/PE or related industries. 
We now flesh out this line of thought and policy by fleshing out some dynamic implications of the 
added value roles played by equity-based finance systems (which roles have been emphasized in the 
literature). To some extent we will be shifting form a discussion of the impacts of individual VC 
companies to broader and even ‘emergent’ phenomena associated with the cluster as a whole. 
 
 
                                                     
13  Interview with Matty Karp of Concord , a leading Israeli VC during the second half of the nineties. 
14  This is so even in areas where Global Value Chains (GVC) exist and even when the innovative SME is not formally part of the chain 
(see 1.1.4 below). 
15  Gompers 1994, 1995 and others compared VC-backed with non-VC backed SU. VC backed startups on average go public younger; 
have less under-pricing, cheaper underwriter costs and higher valuation at the IPO; and perform better after the IPO. The superior 
performances of such companies is due to VCs’ good scanning, monitoring activities, reputational added value, networking added 
value and management added value. 
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1.1.4 Additional Roles of Equity-Based Private Support systems  
 for Innovative SMEs  
The distinctive features of industrializing economies require adapting and re-orienting the 
functions and roles played by VCs in connection with High Tech in the more advanced economies. 
The focus should shift to VC/PE* i.e private, equity-based finance and support systems or 
infrastructures for innovative SME including but not only VC and PE as defined above. We start by 
surveying some organizational forms beyond VC. 
‘Other’ equity-based finance and support organizations 
While there are examples of VC companies who invest in the ‘early stage’ of non-high tech 
areas such as retailing, medical and communications services it seems that most PE companies 
focus on later phase rather than early phase support of companies i.e. frequently their dominant 
strategy does not seem to be the finance and support of the early phase of high-growth companies 
(not even non-high tech ones). Part of the problem seems to be the lack of well developed exit 
mechanisms i.e. the equivalent of NASDAQ for mid/low tech companies (probably due to the fact 
that the potential capital gains from high tech SU are probably much greater than for mid/low tech 
innovative SMEs). There might be two solutions to this problem: creation of (e.g. regionally-based) 
exit markets; and identifying other PE based organizations/institutions that are less dependent on 
medium-term and /or capital gains based exits. Among the latter we have Investment Companies (IC 
s), ‘captive’ VC/PE funds, and Individuals (Angels). 
The activities of IC are based on owner resources or on external investors to whom, in 
contrast to LP VC/PE, there is no commitment to repay principal and returns after a fixed period of 
time. This equity-based system is therefore less dependent on public capital market exit 
mechanisms (IPO) and therefore is more adequate for the finance and support of innovative SMEs 
in industrializing economies. The real contribution of ICs will still depend on whether or not they 
provide significant ‘adding value’ functions beyond the equity investments themselves (a fact 
requiring significant non-financial capabilities).  
Captive VC funds include corporate VC and VCs which are subsidiaries of other financial 
institutions. They are not organized as LP; and their investment objectives need not be exclusively 
maximizing financial returns. Thus a frequent objective of Corporate VC investments is the 
identification and generation of synergies with the parent firm. Intel Capital, one of the largest 
corporate VC funds, invests in companies whose outputs, if successful, will –among other effects–
increase the demand for Intel products. Angels are independent but generally non-organized pools 
of VC. They played important roles in the background and pre-emergence phases prior to VC 
industry emergence in the US during the late 1960s. The scope of angel investments, even after 
establishment of the VC industry, is estimated to be up to ten times that of formal, independent VC. 
To the above we should add Government owned VCs and an assortment of Government 
assisted, private, equity-based finance (and support) organizations oriented to innovative SMEs. 
Government-owned VCs have sprung in Europe and other countries in response to perceived ‘early 
phase finance gaps’ in the SU and innovative SME BS segments. Many seem not to have been very 
successful. Government assisted but privately owned equity based organizations include the well-
know Small Business Investment Companies (SBIC) in the US, created in response to the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) Act of 1959. Those licensed were entitled to loans from the SBA or 
loans guaranteed by the SBA. In the 1960s and 1970s they accounted for about one third of total PE 
investments, but their share has been reduced considerably during the nineties with the enormous 
growth of LP organized VC organizations (Fenn et al 1995, p.4). They played an important role in 
the pre-emergence and industry emergence phases of VC in the US. 
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Roles of VC/PE* in the Learning Economy16 
VCs and by extension VC/PE* could become a pillar of the Knowledge Economy through its 
effect in facilitating the provision of services to Innovative SME’s and SU; by being a node of three 
overlapping networks; and because its capabilities are largely based on tacit knowledge. Moreover, 
by promoting SU they are promoting invention (and indirectly innovation and diffusion), self-
organization and creation of new teams and tacit knowledge, and the continuous building of new 
markets. Interactive learning lies at the basis of these processes. 
VC should be considered as a Service Sector which both substitutes and underpins other 
services industries and markets by bundling equity finance on the one hand with non-cash services 
to innovation SMEs and SU. Archibugui and Lundvall as well as numerous European Commission 
publications put a lot of emphasis on Services and the Services Sector; and on improving SME 
access to Business Services. However, there is no reference to VC; and the assumption is that 
Services markets ‘work’. If services markets do not really work then the desideratum ‘improve 
SME access to Business Services’ would not be fulfilled a fact which will impair the transition to a 
Learning Economy. VC-SU transactions solve not only finance-related market failures but also 
failures in Business or Advisory/Consultancy services’ markets; and (parly) in 
Knowledge/Technology markets. Either they substitute for transactions in these other markets; or 
they help SU to effectively make use of these other markets (which frequently involve complex 
contracting).17 
VC bundle equity finance (which substitutes for the credit market) with some types of 
Advisory and Consultancy and other Business Services to SU. The latter are the non-cash, adding 
value contribution of VCs. The bundling is of a particular type. In contrast to the ‘finance’ 
contribution, the adding value contribution is generally provided without an explicit contract which 
specifies both the types of services and the timing of their provision. Alternatively it could be stated 
that the VC purchase of SU equity sets the basis for subsequent VC activity and VC-SU interaction 
which partly substitutes for explicit market transactions between these agents or even between SU 
and outside suppliers of knowledge and services. In other situations the VC, by virtue of its 
reputation and other inputs e.g ‘Know Whom’ and other information/services, contributes to a 
considerable reduction in transaction costs and to greater use of the market (rather than substituting 
for the market).  
By the same token purchasing (selling) equity implies purchasing (selling) a share in the 
SU’s Knowledge/Technology and even its Innovation Capabilities’ assets.18 VCs could therefore be 
visualized as being either ‘intermediaries’ in the market for Knowledge/Technology or substitutes 
for explicit transactions in these markets. Through both mechanisms they potentially facilitate the 
exchange of information and Knowledge/Technology despite that this in part is achieved be 
reducing ‘regular’ i.e. non equity-linked (or ‘un-bundled’) market transactions.  
Innovative SME support: Roles of equity-based private support systems 
The direct impacts of VCs of VC/PE* on SU or innovative SMEs may trigger ‘dynamic 




                                                     
16  We follow Archibugui and Lundvall 2001 and the contributions to this book in our characterization of the learning economy. 
17  In his famous 1962 article, Arrow mentioned the difficulty of creating markets for information (Arrow, 1962).  
18  These are extreme instances of “bundling” of transactions. Needless to say, the implied transactions in the Knowledge and Services 
markets that accompany VC investments and exits do not substitute for the whole spectrum of such transactions involving SU 
companies. 
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BOX 1 
HOW EQUITY-BASED PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURES (VC/PE*) 
IMPACT INNOVATIVE SMES’ CLUSTERS 
 
 
Source: General VC literature and interviews conducted during 1999 and 2000. 
We briefly deal with each one of these.  
Intermediation and Market Building 
The enhanced access to business and advisory/consultancy services and to 
knowledge/technology that VCs or VC/PE* provide will contribute to the emergence of new 
markets in the relevant cluster. Moreover VCs help SU link to (existing) global product and global 
capital markets. This is particularly important for SMEs and clusters wanting to expand the range of 
markets in which they would like to operate e.g new markets for intermediate inputs which the 
Globalization process is opening (Teece 2000, Porter op. cit.). In high tech the link to global capital 
markets could become an important aspect of the strategy of penetrating global product markets 
(Teubal and Avnimelech, 2003). 
Source of External Capabilities 
VCs complement the capabilities of innovative SMEs, sometimes in those areas were 
entrepreneurs are less likely to be knowledgeable and capable e.g export marketing, know whom, 
management, etc. Such a state of affairs may be the outcome of co-evolutionary processes involving 
both sets of agents. 
Facilitate Complex Contracting 
This is particularly so in relation to marketing agreements, alliances, strategic partnerships, 
M&A, etc. many of these critical for fast access to global product markets. A central condition for 
success in many of these is prior experience which entrepreneurs frequently do not have. A VC or 
VC/PE* sector may or may eventually have such capabilities and thereby have a strong impact on 
innovative SMEs’ quest to rapidly build global market share.  
Promote International Links 
Frequently clusters have dense internal links while external links are few and controlled by 
lead buyers, agents of foreign firms (Bazan and Navas-Aleman 2003) or anchor foreign assemblers 
operating in complex production systems industries (see Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (P&R), 2004). A 
cluster with an internationally oriented VC/PE or related private, equity based sector may make an 




Intermediation and Market Building  
Source of External Capabilities 
Facilitating Complex Contracting 
Promoting International Links 
Supporting of the Global Expansion of Promising Innovative SMEs 
Contribute to Cluster Reputation 
Facilitate the Transition to a Learning Economy 
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Support of Global Expansion of promising Innovative SMEs 
Frequently, absent a VC/PE* sector, there would be a clear System Failure (SF) with respect 
rapidly building the global market share of promising innovative SMEs. As mentioned such an 
expansion might be impossible without the support of agents or firms external to the innovator 
SME, particularly since this requires access to Complementary Assets (Teece, 1986) and functional 
upgrading which has not been common in many clusters e.g. in Latin America (Bazan and Navas 
Aleman 2003 and P&R 2004, see below). This is particularly so in the new global environment with 
new markets emerging for intermediate inputs: VC/PE or related organizations may help such 
companies to shift from their traditional dependence on existing, quasi-hierarchical value chains to 
new markets for intermediate inputs (see 1.1.6 below).  
Contribute to Cluster Reputation 
Initial successes in transforming innovative SMEs into global companies will increase the 
reputation not only of the private, equity-based organizations involved but also, by signaling the 
existence of innovative entrepreneurs, of the high tech cluster itself.  
Facilitate the Transition to a Learning Economy 
Since private, equity-based support organizations are linked to users, producers, suppliers, 
financers, experts and partners their innovative SME support activities will contribute to the 
creation of new cluster links, both domestic and external. Moreover these organizations like the US 
machine tool sector in the 19th Century (Rosenberg, 1972) could constitute a key sector in the 
creation, diffusion and adaptation of tacit knowledge, codified knowledge and technology. 
1.1.5 Cluster Development and Cluster Policies in Developing   
 Countries: Latin America19 
The P&R paper analyzes eleven Latin American clusters of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and 
Nicaragua while the Bazan and Navas-Aleman paper undertakes a deep analysis of the Sinos Valley 
footwear cluster in Brazil. All clusters are populated by large numbers of SMEs. Following. The 11 
clusters are classified into four categories of industries: Traditional Manufacturing e.g. footwear, 
textile, tile and furniture; Resource Based Industries e.g. copper, marble, fruit; Complex Production 
Systems’ Industries e.g. automobiles, auto-parts, aeronautics, electronic producer goods and 
consumer electronic; and Specialized Suppliers-Software. Large buyers have increasingly played 
important roles in the GVC of Traditional Industries; and so has the leading or anchor firm in 
Complex Production Systems’ industries. In the latter industries the local network of suppliers-
many of them SMEs and potentially innovative SMEs-is usually subordinated to foreign anchor 
firms who are repositories of significant design, technological and marketing capabilities.  
The studies focus on identifying and explaining cluster upgrading defined as comprising both 
product/process innovation and functional upgrading (defined as a shift to higher value added 
functions like design, branding and marketing).The two factors emphasized in the analysis are 
collective efficiency (external economies and joint actions within the cluster) and different forms of 
GVC Governance. GVC Governance influences not only chain organization/coordination activities 
but also upgrading and distribution of gains along the chain. While the authors recognize that some 
advances in upgrading and growth have taken place, they also suggest that the potential opened by 
the globalization process has not, in most cases, materialized. This explains the attention given by 
P&R to policy implications of their analysis. 
It is noted that ‘many SME clusters are increasingly participating in GVC’s which factor 
justifies the authors’ above-mentioned focus as being key to understand the global pattern of 
                                                     
19  This section is based on and to some extent closely follows the Bazan and Navas-Aleman 2003 and P&R 2004 papers. The latter 
paper summarizes the existing literature on non-high tech clusters including those in Latin American countries. 
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appropriation of returns to cluster activity. GVC analysis emphasizes how the relationship among 
the various actors in the chain affects their development; and related to this, the nature of GVC 
governance or coordination is central particularly decisions regarding what will be produced; how 
will it be produced; and how much will be produced. Coordination may occur through arms-length 
relations or non-market relationships. The specific questions asked are: (i) what type of chain do 
local firms operate in? (ii) How do different patterns of chain governance favor or hinder the 
different types of upgrading (process, product and functional)? (iii) what collective strategies/joint 
actions by local producers are being undertaken in quasi-hierarchical chains (chains are governed 
by global buyers)?20 And (iv) under what conditions will chain leaders support the upgrading 
process of the firms that make up the value chain?21 
Findings 
The above two papers and the relevant literature quoted there stress the importance of quasi-
hierarchical types of governance and buyer-driven chains. These are a growing phenomenon in part 
due to the increasing concentration of retailing in developed countries. For small firms in 
developing countries-participation in value chains is a way to obtain information about the 
upgrading necessary to gain access to the global market e.g. about the standards that need to be 
met.22 However the authors emphasize the restrictions on upgrading imposed by lead firms in quasi-
hierarchical chains. 
In the footwear cluster of Sinos Valley GVC governance is mostly hierarchical with respect 
to exports to the US; and quasi-hierarchical with respect to exports to Europe. While innovation has 
been frequent functional upgrading has been rare in these chains, although –in comparison with the 
US– more of this exists in Europe oriented GVC and in chains linked to the domestic market. As of 
late a discreet ‘underground revolution’ within the cluster is taking place. It is based on local 
institutions who are undertaking collective functional upgrading efforts. This revolution however is 
threatened by internal rivalries within the cluster and by the strong commitment that some local 
producers still feel towards their global buyers. The Bazan and Navas-Aleman paper points out that 
while the Sinos Valley cluster succeeded in the past it has not been able to shift to high quality 
footwear. The implication is that ways have to be found either for changes in GVC governance or 
more broadly in the relationships between lead firms in hierarchical or quasi hierarchical chains and 
their suppliers in the cluster.23 
Policy Implications 
P&R conclude that the policy approach in most Latin American countries lacks a 
comprehensive and consistent vision of local SME development and upgrading. Policies are 
fragmented e.g. either address technical training or local cluster development or the development of 
domestic GVC suppliers. This is ineffective and a comprehensive S/E perspective to ITP, one 
focusing on a portfolio of coordinated policies rather than on individual actions/policies (see next 
                                                     
20  The relevant literature has identified three or four types of GVC Governance: Network: cooperation among more or less equals, each 
one an independent firm; Quasi-Hierarchy: chains comprising legally independent firms with a leader (e.g. buyer) who sets the rules 
and has a high degree of control over upstream suppliers; and Hierarchy-when a firm is owned by an (usually) foreign firms. In 
addition we have Market-Led governance. 
21  Two theories about the role of chain leaders in promoting upgrading can be found in the literature: one suggesting that chain leaders 
naturally promote innovation and functional upgrading among small local producers; and an opposite view where participation in a 
quasi-hierarchical chain offers very favorable conditions for process and process upgrading; but hinders functional upgrading. It is 
also suggested that networks are ideal for upgrading but are unlikely to come about for developing country producers.  
22  It might also assure access to Complementary Assets (Teece, 1986). 
23  The authors do recognize however that GVC Governance may change over time because existing producers or their spin-offs may 
acquire new capabilities and explore new markets, resulting in changes in power relationships; because maintaining a quasi-
hierarchical governance is costly for the lead firm due to losses in flexibility when confronted with new market conditions; and 
because firms and clusters operate in several types of chains simultaneously which means that skills acquired as a result of 
participation in one chain may be applied and adapted to supplying other chains. The P&R paper also points out that in market-based 
chains the extent of upgrading depends on the ‘determination of SMEs’ i.e entrepreneurship and management; and that loosening of 
vertical intra-chain ties through local initiatives creates “new opportunities for repositioning the cluster in world markets”. 
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section). The authors also stress Selectivity i.e. which clusters to be supported; and a pattern of 
interventions which addresses a small number of essential priorities. This requires systematic 
mapping and analysis of candidate clusters, a requirement necessitating the allocation of adequate 
financial resources to the exploratory and diagnostics phase prior to policy implementation. 
The menu of policies or policy actions comprises three groups: those that facilitate the 
development of External Economies e.g. specialized labor force; policies promoting linkages among 
firms e.g. networks and trust; collective projects, etc.; and strengthening of domestic power within 
the GVC.24 Concerning the last point the authors point out that ‘SME upgrading within hierarchical 
and quasi hierarchical value chains depends on the interest of chain leaders in getting involved and 
directly sustaining the process’. This will depend on many factors but policies such as those 
proposed in connection with Complex Production Systems’ clusters (e.g. activation of appropriate 
intermediaries and government licensing of lead firms) may also make a contribution.25 
1.1.6 Comments on Cluster Adaptation in Latin America 
The P&R 2004 survey discussed above is commendable due to its comprehensiveness and 
attention to policy issues. Yet attention to additional factors analyzed in other literatures not 
considered by the authors could shed additional light both on the alternatives open to Latin 
American clusters and on the specific policy implications arrived at. We will refer to Globalization 
Processes, the Systems-Evolutionary perspective to ITP, and the Theoretical Framework. These will 
substantiate our view that a dynamic ITP cycle framework focusing on generating ‘innovative 
SMEs’ and on creating conditions, including policies, for the emergence of VC/PE or related 
industries could be a wellcome complement to their analysis. 
As mentioned in 1.1 above Globalization is creating a new innovation and increasingly 
competitive environment which is redefining the conditions for SCA of firms, industries and 
clusters. The harsh selection environment characterized not only by high expected returns to 
innovation but also by high risk, is engulfing not only high tech industries but increasingly mid, low 
and service industries as well. It is not necessarily true any more that mid tech or traditional 
industries are low risk although the returns to innovation in these areas may be very high (the global 
market, in principle, is the limit). However, materializing this potential requires a rapid process of 
international expansion and building of market share. Private, equity-based finance and support 
systems for innovative SMEs, which in the last two decades were important for high tech industries, 
may increasingly become important for such expansion in non-high tech areas. A related 
development which further reinforces this view is the creation of new markets for intermediate 
inputs. This would open new opportunities for innovative SMEs who, by accessing such markets, 
might reduce their dependence on the quasi-hierarchical GVC to which many of these are presently 
attached. Again, accessing these markets is difficult especially for young innovative SMEs. VC/PE 
or other equity based systems may make significant contributions in this regard. 
While the above trends supports Porter’s view that clusters are more important than before, 
particularly for innovative SMEs, there may be limits to the type of cluster adaptation emphasized 
by the authors: joint action and enhanced collective efficiency on the one hand and enhanced links 
among existing agents on the other. In our view a more fundamental re-configuration may be 
required. We suggest that in many contexts the emergence of new privately owned finance and 
support infrastructures oriented to innovative SMEs may become a strategic priority. These will 
                                                     
24  Each one of these groups of policies was analyzed in detail. 
25  The authors state that ‘the evidence shows that Complex Production Systems’ group of clusters offers the least opportunities for 
SME upgrading, because it is governed by the global logic of large transnational corporation and quasi hierarchical value chains’. 
But even here there are policies that could help like supporting network brokers to build bridges and negotiate with large value chain 
leaders; provide incentives to large firms to source locally, etc. 
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have the motivation, the capabilities, the power/control and the networks and reputation to access 
the complementary assets required for the rapid expansion of promising innovative SMEs. 
Functional Upgrading as accessing ‘Complementary Assets’ 
The basis for growth according to the authors is innovation (product and process) and 
functional upgrading. The analysis of functional upgrading could benefit from Teece’s analysis of 
Complementary Assets (Teece, 1986). Some forms of functional upgrading e.g. marketing and 
international expansion require that innovative SMEs or other domestic companies access non-
technological ‘Complementary Assets’. According to Teece the difficulty facing these companies’ 
access of Complementary Assets depends on their nature i.e whether they are general, specialized  
or co-specialized; and on the relevant knowledge Appropriation Regime (which depends not only 
on patent protection but on other factors e.g. the extent by which the relevant knowledge is Tacit or 
codified)26 It is more difficult for Specialized Complementary Assets which require 
innovationspecific investments whose access by the market mechanisms may require ‘complex 
contracting’ with outside suppliers (high transactions costs and agency problems may arise). Access 
of complementary assets is also more difficult under a Weak Appropriation Regime since there is 
less time for the ‘innovative SME’ to access the assets first and then, through exports and 
international expansion, obtain profits before other competitors worldwide will irrupt into the 
scene.27 
Teece proposes three strategies for accessing complementary assets: vertical integration, 
market transactions and a third group which includes Strategic Partnerships with larger firms who 
are also owners of complementary assets. The latter-which involve changes in the boundaries of the 
firm-also includes Alliances, Joint Ventures and M&A with such incumbents. This strategy requires 
strong management (including Reputation and Business/Personal Networks) and complex 
contracting capabilities. Innovative SMEs would normally not possess these capabilities, since they 
are basically acquired through experience.28 But they could be key for the rapid international 
expansion which the new global context dictates. 
These capabilities may be more important in the ‘complex products’ and ‘Software’ 
categories than in traditional products like footwear although they could be present in the latter 
category as well. 
Policy Issues 
The menu of choices proposed in the P&R article ignores the dynamic links among policies 
and the consequent possibility that policies may have to be phased. More specifically, the authors 
do not consider the possibility that early policies might lead to feasibility and desirability of 
creating high impact new private, equity-based mechanisms of SME support; and that these may 
change the opportunity set opened to these firms. This also holds for the engineering intensive 
Complex Products’ Category where, despite the scant upgrading noted by the authors, there must be 
enormous opportunities for product and process innovations whose profitability, as mentioned 
above, may crucially depend on accessing the right complementary assets in time.29 
                                                     
26  These difficulties are compounded if the company is an innovative SME due to the difficulty of accessing financial resources. 
27  In Teece’s framework a Weak Appropriability Regime may be due also to the strength of patent protection, etc. which obviously is 
less important here. We ignore for the time being Teece’s third factor –stage of the ILC– and assume that the relevant products in 
innovative clusters of developing countries belong to the Mature Phase of the relevant market and industry (a successful process of 
cluster transformation and the emergence of a pool of innovative SMEs could change this). 
28  These may also be required in other market transactions when agency problems are present e.g. when accessing specific 
complementary assets. 
29  Complex production systems’ goods offer many opportunities for innovation a fact duly pointed out by Rosenberg in various of his 
works (e.g. his work on ‘focusing devices’). This because of the large number of components each of which could (within limits) 
potentially be improved; and because improvements in any component or subsystem offers new opportunities for improvements in 
others. The opposite view i.e. one of limited opportunities for upgrading in the complex production systems’ clusters was explained 
by the authors as being the outcome of constraints imposed by anchor/leading firms. P&R recognize however that some policies may, 
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The VC/PE or other related mechanisms proposed in our ITP phase model for industrializing 
economies could generate greater independence and degrees of freedom for innovative SME 
suppliers (see 1.1.4 above). Through the Intermediation and Distributed Capabilities contributed to 
innovative SMEs these firms stand a change of effectively penetrating new markets. Moreover, 
given that private, equity-based support industries frequently lie at important network nodes, their 
creation will enhance the networking of such companies. It may lead them to participate in other 
GVC networks beyond the original one to which they were attached. Finally, through a variety of 
mechanisms, PE -based support and finance industries may also contribute to generate domestic 
anchor firms. 
Thus in many contexts and in an integrated way with the policy conclusions suggested in the 
P&R article, creation of PE -based finance and support systems for innovative SMEs could become 
a strategic priority (see our Phase 3 in Section 4). Our previous work on VC industries oriented to 
high tech suggests, however, that the road to success in this regard is full of pitfalls. It requires not 
only a Systems perspective to ITP such as that underlying P&R’s analysis but an Evolutionary 
perspective as well. Among other things this means that we should inquire about the background 
conditions for effectively targeting such private infrastructures. It also means that we should pay 
particular attention to the timing, context and design of the relevant targeted policy. 
1.2 Specific Objectives and Structure of the Paper 
 Propose a generic three-phase ITP Cycle Model based on the S/E perspective and 
focused on innovative SMEs and on private, equity-based finance and support 
systems for such companies.30 
The focus on innovative SME’s and their growth and development (rather than on SMEs in 
general as emphasized in the literature) is predicated on the assumption that this category of firms 
will continue to play important roles in innovation-based growth and in the growth of employment. 
As mentioned, this follows from the continued ICT Revolution which directly and indirectly is 
creating new business opportunities and new inducement mechanisms for innovative SMEs e.g new 
technological opportunities, the enhanced level or strength of competition which a global market 
entails (see 1.1.2 above and Lall and Albadalejo, 2003), and enhanced and growing international 
flows of knowledge and technology.31 A related and linked factor is the persistence of the ICT and 
emergence of other Technological Revolutions: their effective economic exploitation, both in 
advanced and in industrializing economies, requires experimenting and applying the new 
technological knowledge in a broad front-a fact which further raises the value of creating innovative 
SMEs.32 
The process of Globalization is bound also to change somewhat the mechanisms by which 
SMEs may contribute to economic growth-although this may depend on ITP policies such as those 
proposed in this paper. Most prominently, depending on case and context, it may increase the 
fraction of very good (and innovative) SMEs which potentially might achieve very high growth 
rates. Thus the expected impacts will be the result both of an increasingly important innovative 
SME segment and because a certain fraction of such companies will grow very fast and become 
                                                                                                                                                                 
despite this, have an effect in inducing the leading firms or assemblers of the quasi-hierarchical GVC to collaborate in the upgrading 
of supplier SMEs. In our opinion, the real opportunities for innovative firms in these sectors may arise from ‘partnering’ with private, 
equity-based finance and support systems. 
30  For related work without the sharp focus on industrializing economies which characterizes this paper see A&T 2006b. 
31  SME survival will increasingly depend on being innovative, and increasingly innovation from the point of view of the domestic 
economy and industry may not be enough (SME innovativeness at the global level may be required). 
32  There are well known limitations on the possibility or disposition of incumbent companies to adopt radical new technology. These 
include organizational and strategic rigidities, increased costs of coordination, the impossibility of providing high powered 
incentives; and increased obsolescence of existing products.  
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large. An excellent example of this is the high tech sector in the US where most of the leading 
companies such as Intel, Microsoft, Cisko and many others originated as VC-backed SU one, two or 
somewhat more decades ago.33 The set of such companies seemed to have a macroeconomic effect 
on the US economy both directly through the high tech sector and indirectly through strong 
spillovers, to the economy at large. These facts suggest that with the right context and policies 
Globalization could provide very good innovative SMEs with a strong growth potential (which 
would only be materialized in a fraction of such companies). There are reasons to believe that this 
phenomenon is not privy to high tech; rather it seems to be increasingly relevant to innovative firms 
in mid and low tech areas and in services as well. 
 Develop a small number of additional variants of the generic model which suit the 
conditions of a non-insignificant group of industrializing economies. 
In this paper we focus first on the Israeli variant of the model (Section 3), which is the base 
upon which we subsequently theorize about the generic model (Section 4). A small set of variants 
or variant classes, tentatively reflecting types of industrializing countries, will then be proposed.  
 Analyze the conditions for success of the three-phase ITP model. 
This is a very complex subject which will only in part be pursued in this paper. A necessary 
though not sufficient condition for success is that the Phase Transition Conditions analyzed below 
in 5.1 hold-more frequently than not these may requirre a consistent policy by Governments to 
support BS innovation. In addition the policies, many of them Targeted Policies, implemented in 
Phase 3 must be successful e.g. they must lead to the emergence of a high impact VC/PE industry 
and possibly, to the emergence of other innovation intensive sectors and clusters. However targeted 
policies are complex and the way to success is fraught with obstacles; moreover due to the 
importance of context, the timing of such policies may be crucial. An important pre-condition for 
success is the development of ITP capabilities, particularly but not only ‘strategic ITP’ capabilities. 
We will briefly discuss this in section 5.3. 
1.3 Method: Conceptual Theory with Examples 
At this stage we have modest aims as far as method is concerned: to present a coherent 
theoretical framework of a dynamic, multi-phase ITP Cycle Model for industrializing economies 
which emphasizes innovative SMEs. As it stands the framework is neither a mathematical model 
(one form of ‘formal theory’) nor ‘appreciative theory’ that is theory which closely follows the 
facts. This is the result of the paucity of the relevant empirical information on ITP across countries; 
and the associated impossibility of undertaking at this stage a cross-country comparative analysis of 
policy cycles. Rather, the knowledge embodied here is a more preliminary form of theorizing than 
Appreciate Theory.34 The reason for dealing with this form of theory is dual: first, to provide 
pointers to policymakers about potentially relevant policy profiles for their countries; second, to 
spur empirical research in the field. In this and in follow-up papers we will illustrate the framework 
with examples from Israel, Chile and Korea. In the future, the framework or a more advanced 
version of it may serve as a platform for conducting systematic research on dynamic ITP in other 
countries. At some point, through the interpretation of sets of cases, it may also generate a body of 
Appreciative Theory.35 
                                                     
33  This point has been emphasized by Lerner 2002 who also emphasizes the role of VC in the process. 
34  We call it ‘conceptual theory’, which while based on knowledge about specific cases e.g. Israel, it is not an attempt to interpret 
information which was systematically collected on a representative sample of cases (i.e. one reflecting a particular context). For this 
reasons it is wrong to call it ‘appreciative theory’. In fact it is a form of ‘formal theory’ albeit a non-mathematical one. 
35  In fact such a research which will eventually lead to additional Appreciative Theory knowledge cannot be undertaken without a well 
developed ‘conceptual theory’ of the sort that this paper proposes for ITP.  
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2. Theoretical Framework: The 
Systems-Evolutionary 
Perspective to Innovation and 
Technology Policy (ITP)36 
The S/E Approach underlining this paper is not only a 
framework for understanding the ‘real world’ (e.g. Nelson 1994, 
Lundvall 1992, Edquist 1997) but also a framework underpinning the 
need, design and implementation of policy-particularly ITP 
(‘normative aspects’, see Metcalfe 1995; Teubal 1999, 2002).37 
Normative aspects go far beyond the justification for Government 
intervention, which is the major topic discussed in the literature. Thus 
a central focus of analysis is the configuration, structure and dynamics 
of ITP; the nature of SF (see below); and the policy process. 
The General Objective of ITP is to promote SI transformation 
by overcoming System (and Market) Failures. Due to radical 
uncertainty, complexity etc. the nature of the desirable SI 
transformation cannot be determined within an ‘optimizing’ 
framework as was the case in early neoclassical analysis (Metcalfe 
1995). Rather it should be determined by a set of Strategic Priorities 
(Teubal, 2002).38 
                                                     
36  For a more detailed presentation see Teubal 2002 and A&T 2006b. 
37  Most Evolutionary/SI theories focus on understanding the real world (our ‘positive aspects’) rather than on policy (‘normative 
aspects’). Moreover, with few exceptions and not unlike Neoclassical Theory, policy (particularly its ‘incentives’ component, less its 
‘institutions’ component) is considered and area of application rather than a field of knowledge in itself (See Teubal 2002). 
38  A main issue is the appropriateness, robustness, adaptability, quality and degree of explicitness of the set of priorities arrived at in a 
particular context. A set of priorities should also be “feasible” and ‘desirable’. We will not be able to deal with this issue here, 
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A SF exists when the existing System of Innovation –SI- will not, through its normal 
operation, achieve such a transformation. For example if the strategic priority is promotion of 
R&D/Innovation in the BS (vision) through development of a domestic VC industry (strategy), a SF 
would exist if the operation of the existing system, particularly the BS (market forces), would not 
lead to this outcome. To overcome a SF pertaining to a particular context it is necessary that the ITP 
implemented address the specific causes of the SF. These could include: 
• Innovation, Knowledge and Learning Externalities e.g. from R&D, Penetration of new 
Markets, Management, etc. 
• Failure to assemble a critical mass of capabilities in a short period of time. 
• Weak High Tech or KBE –due to cultural constraints, Bankruptcy Laws, etc.–. 
• Limited SU Access to Financial Resources e.g. due asymmetric information, uncertainty, etc. 
• Weak Supporting Structure e.g. Technology Centers. 
• Weak Institutional Framework. 
• Non existing or underdeveloped Networks. 
• Co-ordination Failures. 
The set of specific SF causes to be addressed will vary from country to country and from 
phase to phase (and so would the policies resulting from these objectives, for VC in Israel see 3.1 
below). It is obvious that effective SI transformation requires looking at the whole system and at the 
broader domestic and external context. It also means that the success of any one program or policy 
action will depend on the simultaneous existence or non-existence of other policies so coordination 
and appropriate timing of policies should be explicitly considered. From this it follows that ITP 
should be viewed as an integrated whole that is a portfolio of incentives programs and changes in 
institutions. 
Table 1 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICY: EARLY NEOCLASSICAL  
AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 
 Neoclassical Systems-Evolutionary 
Behavioural 
assumptions 
Maximizing agents under 
certainty 
Optimizing policy maker 
Seeking/Adapting agents under uncertainty; adaptive policy maker 
Processes and 
Equilibrium 
Mostly static analysis. Focus 
on equilibrium which could be 
non-unique 
Focus on evolutionary processes (involving variation, selection and 
reproduction) which frequently do not involve equilibrium situations; 
also importance of co-evolutionary processes. Importance of 




innovation a result of formal 
R&D 
A Result of both formal R&D, of other agents e.g. users; and of 
interagent interactions. Importance of Tacit Knowledge; Technology 
Life Cycles and Technological Revolutions 
Competition End-state equilibrium A process (‘dynamic competition’) 
Policy Process Ignored An important aspect of the policy framework. It may start with 
setting strategic priorities (strategic level of policy) and proceed to a 
phase of identifying SF and the design of specific interventions 
(incentives programs or changes in institutions) 
Reason for public 
policy intervention 
To compensate for market 
failures (i.e. externalities); 
there are no clear analytical 
links through time between 
incentives programs 
To overcome specific causes for SF (which block the un-aided 
achievement of society’s strategic priorities) A focus on learning 
and transformation of systems of innovation. 
Type of policy 
preferred and nature 
of policy portfolio 
Horizontal and non-targeted: 
i.e. patents, R&D subsidies, 
tax credits, etc. 
Both Horizontal and Targeted (sector or technology specific), i.e. VC
for SU; a mix between incentives and changes in institutions; a 
policy portfolio that changes over time (with links among programs)
Source:  General Literature and  Morris Teubal ‘s  Lectures at the Hebrew University.
                                                                                                                                                                 
despite its importance. Rather, when describing the three-phase model, we will be assuming that the country concerned has identified 
a set of strategic priorities, which is ‘reasonable’, given the context in which it operates.  
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3. Summary of Israel’s Three Phase 
ITP Cycle Model39 
3.1 Summary of the Three Phases and Data 
Box 2 schematically outlines the three phases ITP Cycle model 
as applied to Israel. This is only one out of a set of variants that the 
‘generic’ model can generate. For reasons of space the presentation 
below is schematic. It is important to note that there must be other 
variants relevant to other countries wishing to develop VC industries. 
The main ITP implemented in Phase 1 was the Grants to BS 
R&D. This was an Horizontal Program initiated with the foundation in 
1969 of the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) at Israel’s Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. An additional small but highly relevant program 
which started in the early 1980s was the Bi-national R&D Fund 
(BIRD-F) which supported collaborative R&D programs involving a 
US and an Israeli company. These programs were effective in diffusing 
R&D/Innovation in the BS; in developing Innovation Capabilities; and 
in forging business links and networks with the US. The policy 
portfolio of Phase 1 reflects Israel’s special circumstances where, till 
Phase 3, the main considerations surrounding that country’s Science, 
Technology and Higher Education policies were related to 
survival/defense and cultural considerations (rather than purely 
economic ones). It follows that such policies were not part of ITP 
which for our purposes should be circumscribed in this paper to 
‘economically motivated ITP.  
                                                     
39  For further analysis see A&T 2005a, 2006bc. 
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Box 2 


















Source: A & T.2004, 2006a.  
Note: * Almor and Hashai, 2003. 
 
Box 3 and Tables 2 and 3 bring data on policies initiated and/or implemented in Israel during 
Phases 2 and 3.  
Box 3 




















Source: A & T.2004, 2006a. 
 
 
Phase 1: Diffusion of R&D and Generating Innovation Capabilities (1969-1984) 
Horizontal Grants to company R&D Æ Creation of R&D performing companies and of 
civilian High Tech industry. First SU companies. 
Phase 2: Strengthening of BS R&D and SU/VC Experiments (1985-1992) 
Business Experiments and Informal VC activity Æ New Model of SU (‘born global’ with 
links to global capital/product markets),* learning (various dimensions –see below–). 
ITP: Sharp Increase in R&D grants, Incubator and Magnet program (supporting 
cooperative, generic R&D); First VC support program (Inbal) Æ expansion of BS R&D Æ
Increased rate of SU formation Æ increased Demand for VC services. 
Policy Learning: Learning from Inbal’s failure and from Business Experiments Æ
Identification of SF (absence of a significant VC industry) and Selection of LP form of VC 
Organization. 
Phase 3: Accelerated Growth of R&D and High Tech (1993-2000) 
Targeted Support of VC (Yozma Program); continuation of all ITP programs, R&D Grants 
peaked in 2000 Æ Emergence of a VC industry Æ Accelerated growth of SU segment and 
High Tech; large numbers of IPOs and M&A, etc. 
1. Inbal (1991): a Government owned Insurance company, which gave partial (70%) 
guarantees to traded VC funds. Four VC companies were established under Inbal 
regulations. While the program failed to spur VC industry emergence the lessons learned 
from this first attempt to implement VC policies indirectly contributed to the design and 
implementation of Yozma (the successful targeted VC program). 
2. Yozma Program (1993-1998): a one-shot targeted program involving $100M 
Government venture component 80M$ of which was invested in 10 Funds ($8M per fund a 
Fund of Funds function). ’Yozma Funds’ were Israeli owned and managed; they operated in 
the local market; and they adopted an early phase investment strategy oriented to high tech 
SU. The Yozma Program was a high impact, targeted program which triggered both VC 
emergence and the associated re-configuration of Israel’s high tech cluster. The 
Government investment component was privatized in 1997/1998. 
3. Magnet Program (started in 1992): a $60M a year Horizontal Program supporting 
cooperative, generic R&D involving two or more firms and at least one University. 
4. Technological Incubators (started in 1991): a program supporting entrepreneurs 
during the Seed Phase, for a period of 3 years. The incubators are privately owned and 
managed. Both they and the projects get significant financial support from the Government. 
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Table 2 
ANNUAL OCS GRANTS, BIRD GRANTS AND VC INVESTMENTS 1970-2003 
(million dollars) 
 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 
Total grants (M$) 2,5 98 107 136 346 440 375 369
Regular fund (M$) 2,5 98 106 133 294 337 291 283
Incubators (M$) 0 0 0 0 31 32 27 26
Magnet (M$) 0 0 0 0 16 67 58 53
Royalties (M$) 0 2 7 14 56 135 149 135
BIRD Grants 0 2 7 12 12 8 10 11
VC Investments (M$) 0 0 ~5 ~50 ~400 3 100 1 139 1 011




ALLOCATION OF OCS R&D GRANTS  
(million dollars) 











1985 106    (2,5%) 106 0 0 6 (33,3%) NA 
1986 110    (2,8%) 109 0 0 7 (16,7%) NA 
1987 113    (2,7%) 112 0 0 8 (14,3%) NA 
1988 120    (6,2%) 118 0 0 9 (12,5%) NA 
1989 125    (4,2%) 122 0 0 10 (11,1%) NA 
1990 136    (8,8%) 133 0 0 14 (40,0%) NA 
1991 179  (31,6%) 171 0 4 20 (42,9%) 12 
1992 199  (11,2%) 177 1 16 25 (25,0%) 10 
1993 231  (16,1%) 199 40 24 33 (32,0%) 12 
1994 317  (32,2%) 172 10 27 42 (27,3%) 10 
1995 346    (9,1%) 294 16 31 56 (33,3%) 12 
1996 351    (1,4%) 279 36 30 79 (41,1%) 13 
1997 397  (13,1%) 309 53 30 103 (30,4%) 12 
1998 400    (0,8%) 305 61 30 117 (13,6%) 14 
1999 428    (7,0%) 331 59 30 139 (18,8%) 9 
2000 440    (2,8%) 337 67 32 135 (10,8%) 8 
2001 431   (-2,0%) 328 64 32 145   (5,2%) 11 
2002 383 (-11,0%) 291 58 27 153   (1,4%) 10 
2003 369   (-3,4%) 283 53 26 133  (-5,4%) 11 
Source: OCS and BIRD. 
Note: * A few million dollars till the early 1990s.  
 
Tables 4-6 describe central features of Israel’s new high tech Cluster of the 1990s which we 
have argued was propelled by targeting VC (The Yozma program, see A&T 2004a, 2005b,2006d). 
The high impact of Yozma was partly due to the strong reinforcement of the Grants to R&D policy 
after 1985 and to the implementation of the new set of policies during Phase 2 (Box 3 and Tables 2 
and 3). The first table (Table 4) indicates capital raised by the emerging VC industry as well as 
other indicators which show the high VC-intensity of Israel (last column).40 Table 5 proves that the 
phenomenon of high tech growth in Israel during the 1990s was not only a ‘capital market 
phenomenon’ since it was associated with a significant expansion in production, sales and exports 
of goods. Finally Table 6 indicates the main parameters of the new Silicon Valley type Cluster 
which emerged as a result of the concerted action of most of the policies mentioned above.41 
                                                     
40  Numerous reports have shown that Israel is the most VC-intensive country in the world when this is measured as a share of GNP. 
This is even more so when calculations are based on a ‘strict definition of VC’ which is the central feature of Israel’s VC industry.  
41  See Teubal and Avnimelech 2003. 
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Table 4 
ISRAEL: VENTURE CAPITAL RAISED AND INVESTED, 1991-2003 PERIOD 
Year VC Raised VC under Management* 
VC Invested (% of 
foreign sources) 
VC investment as 
% of GDP 
1991 58 80 NA NA 
1992 160 240 NA NA 
1993 372 612 NA NA 
1994 374 986 NA NA 
1995 156 1 142 NA NA 
1996 397 1 539 NA NA 
1997 729 2 268 440 0,41 
1998 706 2 974 589 (36%) 0,54 
1999 1 851 4 825 1 011 (43%) 0,9 
2000 3 701 8 504 3 092 (59%) 2,6 
2001 1 100 9 546 1 985 (59%) 1,65 
2002 63 9 609 1 140 (58%) 0,96 
2003 300 9 600 1 000 (61%) 0,84 
Source: Avnimelech (2004) and IVA. 
Note: * Management companies that invested at the current year and with at least $3M available for 
investments at the end of the year. 
 
Table 5 
ISRAELI ICT AND SOFTWARE MANUFACTURING: SALES,  
EXPORTS (THOUSANDS US$) AND EMPLOYEES 















1990 3 300 2 100 32 000 103 400 75 5 000 80 
1991 3 600 2 280 33 000 109 540 110 5 000 108 
1992 4 000 2 660 34 200 117 600 135 5 500 109 
1993 4 600 3 200 36 400 126 700 175 6 200 113 
1994 5 200 3 750 37 600 138 800 220 7 000 114 
1995 5 900 4 300 39 200 151 950 300 7 700 123 
1996 6 500 4 880 42 000 155 1 300 600 8 500 153 
1997 7 200 5 700 43 700 165 1 780 1 000 10 000 178 
1998 8 000 6 550 45 600 175 2 350 1 500 11 500 204 
1999 8 600 7 130 48 000 179 2 950 2 000 13 000 227 
2000 12 500 11 000 54 800 228 3 700 2 600 14 500 255 
2001 11 250 9 750 47 000 239 4 100 3 000 15 000 273 
2002 10 000 8 800 43 200 231 2 800 1 900 13 200 212 
Source: CBS and other sources. 
 
In previous work of ours we extensively analyze the causes for the successful targeting of VC 
during 1993 (A&T 2005b; 2006a, b, d). Among the main causes of success we have: 1) the 
appropriate background and pre-emergence conditions which were created during Phases 1 and 2;42 
2) a very successful ‘design’ of Yozma which, by overcoming the specific causes of SF and 
initiating a cumulative and autocatalytic process of growth, induced emergence of the VC industry 
(see also 5.2 below); and 3) the increasingly favorable external environment (expanding global 
markets) till the year 2000. 
                                                     
42  See Box 2. Among these we should mention emergence of a critical mass of high tech SU which represented a strong unsatisfied 
‘demand’ for the future VC industry; and the significant experimentation and learning by both Business and Government (about the 
appropriate structure of the VC industry aimed at one which fit well with the local context and institutions), etc.  
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Table 6 
ISRAEL'S HIGH TECH CLUSTER - SELECTED STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS (1970S-1990S) 
Accumulated during the decade 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Number of SU creation ~2 500 ~300 ~150 
Funds Raised by VCs: M$ ~8 500 ~50 0 
Capital Invested in Israeli SU by VCs (inc. foreign): M$ ~6 650 ~50 0 
Accumulated No of IPOs (high tech): 126 9 1 
Accumulated VC-backed IPOs: 72 3 0 
Accumulated # of significant M&As by MNE: ~75 0 0 
Capital raised in NASDAQ in the decade: M$ ~10 750 ~50 ~10 
M&A: B$ ~18 200 ~0 ~0 
Figure for the end of the Decade 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Number of International Investment Banks in Israel N/A 1 0 
Number of VC Companies ~100 2 0 
Share of ICT Exports in Manufacturing Exports 54% 28% ~14% 
ICT manufacturing Exports M$ 12 950 2 450 350 
Software Exports MS 2 600 75 0 
Civilian R&D as Percentage of GDP 4,8% 2,8% 1,8%
ICT Employees (thousands) 152 ~80 ~60 
ICT Skilled Employees (thousands) 57 37 ~26 
Patents Issued 969 325 140 
Source: SU numbers come from three sources: CBS, OCS and IVA. Other information from other sources 
such as the US Patent and Trademark Office.  
Note: * Frequently the figures in the box are approximations due to gaps in the availability of data, the 
existence of various sources of information (including fragmentary information from non-official sources). 
3.2 The Wider Relevance of the Israeli Case 
In the two sub-sections that follow we expand what was mentioned above in Section 1.1.  
3.2.1 Top Tier Industrializing Economies have/could create SCA  
 in Software and IT high tech and therefore in R&D and VC 
Globalization is creating new opportunities for Software services, product Software and 
R&D-based IT industries which certain low cost countries with skills are (and increasingly will) 
exploit. The creation or expansion of such new industries within the top tier category of 
industrializing economies is linked directly or indirectly to a number of trends. We mention two: (i) 
the increased outsourcing of Software and IT services by large US corporations e.g. to Indian 
software/software services companies, a trend not abated by the 2000-2004 high tech crisis; and (ii) 
acceleration of the establishment of R&D Labs of leading Multinational Enterprises particularly in 
India and China. The Israeli experience and probably also the Korean, Taiwanese and Irish 
experience show that these and other trends and events could set the base for the rapid development 
of an indigeneously based IT industry in top tier industrializing nations. More specifically that 
experience suggests that, from a longer term perspective, future successful Phase 3 policies of some 
presently Phase 1 non-top tier industrializing economies could involve the development of high tech 
or a combination of high tech and other innovation intensive industries.  
For those countries which are successful in adapting to the new set of circumstances the 
process of Globalization permits the access from abroad of an increasing share of the important 
elements and critical resources required for the establishment of a high tech cluster (even in the 
absence of well organized markets). The mechanism could be direct or indirect. We have argued 
elsewhere that the outsourcing of IT and software services could set the basis for the development 
of indigenous product software in countries like India e.g. many of the indigenous Indian 
companies in these areas (e.g. Infosys) have generated a reputation and have relatively deep 
knowledge of the needs of high profile MNE in the US (A&T, 2004d). Moreover, spinoffs and 
collective learning by engineers and managers employed in R&D labs of foreign MNE will 
contribute to the founding and growth of indigenous high tech companies.  
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An alternative direct effect of globalization is the gradual creation of global markets in what 
previously were critical though relatively non traded inputs and services.43 The increasingly 
widespread access to e.g. consultancy services, marketing, technical assistance, markets for 
technology, etc. eliminates some of the obstacles which prevented high tech growth in a previous 
era. As part of this process we should also mention the predicted post crisis possibilities for M&A 
and IPO in Global Markets. Both have the effect of anticipating and enhancing the rewards from 
invention/innovation (Teubal and Avnimelech, 2003); and in the case of IPOs they could 
significantly enhance the possibilities of penetrating global product markets. 
Having said that we should state clearly that the benefit from Globalization may, in most 
cases, crucialy depend on Government policies which judiciously combine and phase support for 
infrastructure, entrepreneurship and innovation. While complex, these policies like those directed to 
the creation of indigenous VC/PE industries or other private and equity-based infrastructures, may 
be extremely relevant for some countries during Phase 3; and could succeed. 
3.2.2 Commonalities between a VC industry serving high tech SU 
 companies and context-dependent VC/PE* industry     
 configurations directed to innovative SMEs 
This paper is predicated on the assumption that the three phase ITP model, initially suggested 
in connection with R&D support and VC finance of high tech SU, is also applicable to analyze 
direct and indirect Government support of innovative SMEs in industrializing economies. A major 
aspect is identifying the configuration of the VC/PE* which is appropiate for the finance/support of 
innovative SME’s in a particular context.44 Related to this, due to increasing prevalence of the high 
risk/high return environment, Globalization seemingly is increasing the similarity between those 
innovative SMEs (and sometimes the contexts in which they operate) and the high tech SU 
companies of advanced or peripheral countries like Israel. At the risk of being repetitious we 
summarize these below: 
SMEs increasingly rely on (New) Knowledge 
Enhanced Global Competition is increasing the reliance on Innovation and Knowledge not 
only technological knowledge but also knowledge related to markets/marketing, organization, 
management, etc.. This is increasingly true in mid and low tech as it naturally was and is in high 
tech industry. 
Enhanced management skills, networking and reputation required for global 
competition45 
Global competition implies not only that more knowledge will be required for decision 
making but also that significant management capabilities (including reputation and networking 
capabilities) may increasingly be required to implement the decisions e.g. in the area of complex 
contracting operating under conditions of uncertainty. Like with high tech SU some of these involve 
extending the boundaries of the firm through e.g. collaborations, strategic partnerships, M&A etc. 
Frequently these capabilities are not existent and cannot be generated within individual SMEs. This 
fact could hinder both their transformation into innovative SMEs and materialization of their high 
growth potential. 
                                                     
43 This is Porter’s argument discussed in 1.1. 
44 What is required is a new Intermediation Form between the support structure and the corresponding innovative SME segment. This 
requires the mutual adaptation of supply agents (VC/PE*), demand agents (organization and orientation of SME segment) and 
institutional framework (Marcus and Teubal, 2005, in process). This mutual adaptation took place in the US prior to emergence of 
VC during the 1970s (see Gompers and Lerner 1999, 2001). Gompers 1994 mentions that the US VC industry also financed and 
supported high growth companies which are not high tech e.g. Federal Express and Starbucks. 
45  See Lall and Albaladejo op.cit. 
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System Failures frequently block creation of an innovative SME segment. Solving them 
may require the development of VC/PE or other private, equity-based support systems 
From the finance and ‘other support’ perspectives, the transformation of SME’s into 
innovative SME’s is not automatically assured due to pervasive SF. The information asymmetries, 
unknown firm and management, significant share of intangible assets, volatility of global markets 
and increasingly high share of intangible assets –which have been linked to imperfections in the 
credit markets facing high tech SU (Gompers and Lerner 1999, Chapter 1)– are also present also in 
relation to the broader category of ‘innovative SMEs’. This also holds with varying intensity and 
focus in relation to imperfections in other markets such as Business Services and 
Knowledge/Technology. Let us denote the prevailing System/Market failures prior to the 
emergence of VC/PE (or other equity based institutions) by SF1. Our and the literature’s analysis 
suggests how these institutions might overcome such failures. 
SF1 should be distinguished from SF2 which are the System/Market failures blocking the 
successful emergence of the specialized, private, equity based infrastructurers which are supposed 
to overcome SF1. The literature on how VC/PE overcomes SF1 assumes that the new financial 
segment or industry already exists and is operating. This however, cannot be taken for granted; 
moreover previous work of ours demonstrates that –in connection with VC and high tech– 
overcoming SF2 requires overcoming simultaneously a large number of constraints (see A&T, 
2005a). There are sufficient grounds a priori to assume that this will frequently also be the case in 
connection with the emergence of a venture-oriented PE or VC/PE* industry in industrializing 
economies.46 This means that the private infrastructure of finance/support to innovative SME’s 
might not emerge without a new set of Government Policies. If such policies succeed in overcoming 
SF2 the System of Innovation may be transformed into a high-impact system as far as the strategic 
priority “promotion of innovative SMEs” is concerned. 
                                                     
46  Both VC and PE are specialized institutions or industries (rather than simply ‘pools of money’) where capabilities, strategies, 
learning processes and organization play will increasingly play crucial roles in overcoming SF1. Thus managers of these institutions 
should be knowledgeable of the technologies and markets of the companies they invest in (‘portfolio companies’). They should also 
perform important certification and networking functions to assure the rapid international expansion of promising innovative SMEs. 
Due to the complex coordination problems which could arise in order to assemble a critical mass of these resources (see A&T 2005a 
for the case of Israel), it is likely that the unaided working of the market may fail. Moreover, due to path dependence, a failed market 
led process may pre-empt what could be a potentially successful policy-led process of emergence of the new support systems.  

CEPAL - SERIE Estudios y perspectivas – Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires N° 36 
35 
4. Towards a ‘Generic’ ITP Cycle 
Model 
The explicit analysis of the background and pre-emergence 
conditions for the establishment of a VC/PE or related equity-based 
innovative SME support industry in industrializing economies is a 
central objective of this paper. This section pursues this objective 
within a S/E framework of analysis which, given the presumed 
prevalence of SF, is based on a ITP Cycle Model. A second very 
important objective of the paper is to identify conditions for success in 
that objective including e.g. an appropriate design for the VC/PE-
directed ITP program, appropriate timing of implementation, etc. 
These will be analyzed in the next section. 
The first task of this section is to identify both the Overall 
Strategy underlying our ITP Cycle Model; and the Strategic Priorities 
required for each Phase. We then proceed to characterize the 
distinctive policy portfolios of each phase. 
4.1 Policy Objectives 
4.1.1 Overall Strategy-An Innovative SME   
 orientation  
This paper is predicated on the assumption that for a large class 
of industrializing economies one aspect of their overall strategy should 
be generation of an Innovative SME segment. The overall strategy 
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would include other components as well.47 For a Follower Country Strategy it has included e.g. in 
the Korean case the strategic priority of creating large firms; while in other cases, like Korea 
nowadays where the overall strategy is to shift to a Knowledge Based Economy, a strategic priority 
is generation of an important high tech SU segment.48 In other countries like Argentina and Chile 
generation of a strong ‘innovative SME segment’ is or could be part of an overall strategy of 
stimulating innovation in general with more specific strategic priorities being the upgrading both of 
Natural Resource exploitation and of capabilities of Large Firms.49 
Like with high tech SU in advanced countries, the role of innovative SMEs is to exploit the 
opportunities for innovation opened up by the Globalization process in a wide front. Within this 
broad strategy two targets should be identified: generating a pool of innovative SMEs; and 
stimulating SME company growth. While a large segment of Innovative SMEs is always important, 
it is thought that a strong growth and employment impact would require that a fraction of 
Innovative SMEs become large companies.50 
4.1.2 Strategic Priorities 
Promotion of an innovative SME segment is a strategic priority of Phases 1 and 2 while 
promotion of a VC/PE* industry is a strategic priority of Phase 3. Other such priorities refer to the 
Science, Technology and Education (S/T/E) infrastructure e.g. assurance during Phase 1 that a 
‘basic’ infrastructure exists and is or will become operational. This will underpin both BS 
innovation and SME innovation during all phases. 
During Phase 2, both as a stimulus to innovative SMEs and to innovation/learning in general 
in Phase 3, the basic national S/T/E infrastructure’ (established in Phase 1) should be considerably 
reinforced. Moreover, following the ‘supply-push’ focus of these infrastructures in Phase 1 it should 
now add a measure of i) ‘business orientation including efforts to build links with the BS (e.g. 
University-BS links); ii) focus on the needs of innovative SMEs. These changes should be 
accomplished without diluting quality of research, development, technology transfer or other 
functions performed. These aims could be achieved by establishing or expanding collective 
organizations such as Technological Centers; promoting collaborative innovation and collaborative 
generic R&D programs; etc.51 Such efforts will underpin and scaffold Phase 3’s innovative effort, 
thereby contributing to its acceleration. Gradual targeting of the technological infrastructure to areas 
                                                     
47 An important additional component which is only addressed indirectly is generating the conditions for transition to a Learning 
Economy (Archibugui and Lundvall, 2001). The perspective of this paper is not only consistent with the broader Learning Economy 
perspective; it could pave the way for such a transition in Phase 3 (e.g. through VC/PE which are nodes of networking, interactive 
learning and tacit knowledge). Needless to say, however, that additional policies not specified here are also required. We can 
characterize some of these as being related to the broader interface between ‘Economy’ and ‘Society’. 
48  Korea’s strategy of Economic Development of the last decades is not reflected in our Three Phase Model in a central way, given its 
emphasis on large company conglomerates (chaebol’s) throughout. In their original model we can identify an Imitation/Catching up 
Phase and an Innovation phase, the latter starting during the 1980s (Kim 1997). While overall growth performance was outstanding 
the limits to the model began to show up in the early 1990s and especially during the 1997 crisis (Kim & Nelson 2000, introduction 
and Chapter 11). The present restructuring and re-orientation of the System of Innovation represents a shift from Phase 2 of the 
ImitationÆ Innovation (or Catching up) model to Phases 2-3 of our model which is much more adapted to the ongoing Globalization 
Processes. The new strategy that emerged from the 1997 crisis was a Knowledge Based Economy strategy where the country is 
paying very strong attention to technological entrepreneurship and high tech start up companies (Dahlman and Andersson 2003). 
49  For these countries the ‘innovative SMEs’ strategic priority is intended both to make a strategy based on exploitation of Natural 
Resource more effective and to avoid its limitations (both physical and others). It would also be directed to avoid the limitations of a 
strategy based solely on the Large Firm segment of the economy. As mentioned in Section 1 the current phase of the ICT Revolution 
(which we may term the ‘entrepreneurial phase’) requires large numbers of innovative SMEs to effectively exploit its economic 
potential.  
50  See 1.2. This objective would also facilitate a renewal of the Economic Elites of the country whenever these are linked to ownership 
and management of large companies. Such a renewal may in turn be important both for keeping the market economy efficient 
(avoiding its sliding into ‘crony capitalism’) and for maintaining a vigorous democratic political system (an assumption here is that a 
measure of insulation between the economic and the political sphere is important for democracy). 
51  Like for VC/PE a minimum of diffusion of R&D/Innovation may be required for effective pre-competitive collaborative 
infrastructure development (a ‘demand’ effect). Under these conditions, establishing such technological infrastructures will generate 
a strong impetus to regular R&D/Innovation-and a pattern of co-evolution may thus also come into being. 
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or industries of national importance (see below) will also contribute to the acceleration of 
innovation and learning in Phase 3 and to a successful transition to a Knowledge-based or Learning 
Economy.  
Finally, achievement of Phase 2 priorities/targets requires bolstering policy capabilities. 
These would enable policy makers to face the policy challenges of Phase 3 (and Phase 2) 
particularly with respect to targeting specific areas, industries and clusters. The policy capabilities 
required are strategic capabilities; they should enable setting the above strategic priorities and 
translating them into programs and policies (Teubal, 2002). Explicit efforts should be undertaken in 
this direction. Important examples are Korea’s post 1997 beefing up of its strategic capabilities 
(Dahlman and Andersson op. cit)52 and Finland’s efforts during the 1980s and beyond.53 
The objectives and Strategic Priorities for each phase of the Generic ITP Cycle are shown in 
Box 4. 
Box 4 
OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES OF A GENERIC ITP CYCLE 
                                                     
52  The Korean policy framework to effectively make the transition to a Knowledge Based Economy involves consolidating a vision and 
planning with regard to four major areas: Incentives and Institutional Regime; Education, Training and Human Resource 
Management; Information Infrastructure; and the Innovation System. New mechanisms have been created to identify the details of 
the vision/strategy. Also new procedures of evaluation and ministerial coordination have been put in place. Note that the policy 
framework of Korea is broader than that of our ITP Cycle model which focus on one of the four areas (Innovation System) more than 
on the others.  
53  See Yla-Antilla and Lomola 2003. The changes in Israeli Policy which led to emergence of the VC industry (Phase 3) were the result 
of a shift to an entrepreneurial style of ITP in the early 1990s and to the actions of Key Agents rather than to the explicit creation of a 
new policy system or new procedures for policy making. While this has been very successful during the 1990s it is doubtful whether 
the policy infrastructure which exists is sufficient to effectively confront all the new challenges confronting the country today (see 
5.3 below).  
PHASE 1: CREATING AN INNOVATIVE SME SEGMENT THROUGH DIRECT and 
INDIRECT SUPPORT OF INNOVATION/R&D 
Strategic Priorities/Targets 
Business Sector 
 Significant Diffusion of Innovation, including adoption and dissemination of new 
technologies and applied R&D, in the BS without discriminating against (or positively 
favoring) SMEs. 
 Creating a mass of Innovative SMEs and, indirectly, sufficient ‘Demand’ for Phase 2 
ITP. 
 Wide experimentation with different types of innovation, companies, sectors, 
technologies, etc. (generating ‘variation’). 
 Promote Learning to Innovate/R&D (including Collective Learning). 
Supporting Structure 
 Assure existence and operation of a ‘basic’ set of S/T/E institutions. 
 Create (or adapt) a network of Technology and Innovation support Institutes; and 
their activation with a view of supporting the future (and do some extent the present) 
needs of an Innovative SME sector. 
 Promote Mission Oriented technological infrastructure in a small number of areas or 
sectors of vital importance to the economy (e.g. major export sectors). 
 Selected and phased liberalization and opening up; and selected nurturing of 
international business links. 
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PHASE 2: CREATING CONDITIONS FOR ACCELERATING INNOVATION: SUPPLY, 
DEMAND AND POLICY CAPABILITIES 
Strategic Priorities/Targets 
 Promoting Technological Infrastructure(increasingly of a mission-oriented nature); 
 Facilitating KBE; 
 Generating a ‘Strategic ITP Capability’ and a Platform for Implementing Targeted 
Policies. 
Tasks: identifying areas/sectors with potential SCA, promote experiments in the BS, 
tentative/test targeting initiatives, etc. 
 Continued growth of Innovative SMEs while assuring a critical mass of such 
companies and sufficient ”Demand” for VC/PE* (‘sufficient demand’ to trigger emergence 
of such private infrastructures). 
PHASE 3: ACCELERATION OF INNOVATION/LEARNING and TRANSITION TO A 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 
Strategic Priorities/Targets 
 A significant increase in the share of R&D (or “innovative effort”)* to GNP, in some 
cases to over 2%; the share of National R&D performed by the BS (in some cases to 
60% or more); and in the share of BS R&D financed by the BS itself (to 2/3 or more in 
some cases. 
 Develop a ‘globally linked’ domestic VC/ PE* industry and market adapted to finance 
and support innovative SMEs. Depending on context, this could rely more or less 
extensively on policy and on foreign companies. 
 Rapid Growth of an Innovation intensive BS including a dynamic SME segment and 
in some cases, of High Tech Industry. 
 Accelerating creation and growth of R&D intensive and innovation intensive 
companies; and providing conditions for the fast growth of a subset of them. 
 Achieve significant (or non-insignificant, depending on case) world market shares in 
a number of innovation-based sectors. 
 Assuring the successful co-evolution between the Science, Technology and Higher 
Education infrastructure/support structures and the BS. 
*as with the Catching-Up model at this phase the R&D measure could be much more 
important than what it was during previous Phases. 
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4.2 Policy Portfolios 
4.2.1 Phase 1: Creating an Innovative SME segment through   
 Direct and Indirect Support of Innovation/R&D  
Box 5 














From the direct Government BS support viewpoint the main priorities and targets of Phase 1 
are: promote BS innovation/R&D, create a mass of innovative SMEs, and undertake 
experimentation in a wide front. This requires implementing Horizontal programs although in some 
cases, when sectors and clusters with clear SCA have been identified, there should also be a small 
number of Targeted Programs as well.54 
Horizontal programs are not only well adapted to promote individual and collective learning 
(Teubal 1996,1997; A&T 2006b); they are also ideal for a) experimenting with new options in 
terms of type of innovation, company, technology, markets etc. (generating Evolutionary 
“variety”); and b) facilitating the identification of areas of potential SCA for the economy in 
question. The latter, together with proof of SF, would be the basis for targeting specific sectors with 
high growth (‘selection’/ ‘reproduction’). 
4.2.2 Phase 2: Creating conditions for Accelerating Innovation:  
 Supply, Demand and Policy Capabilities 
While a shift to targeting is probably important to facilitate the widespread diffusion of 
innovation and learning, its implementation requires a significant re-inforcement of policy 
capabilities. Another reason for enhanced capabilities is the increased scope of Phase 2’s policy 
portfolio and the enhanced needs of coordination among its various components. 
                                                     
54  In Chile already in Phase 1 (starting early 1990s) it was possible and even desirable to implement targeted policies directed to the 
Copper, Forestry & Fisheries areas, since it became increasingly clear that already then the country enjoyed a sustainable competitive 
advantage in those clusters. For an interesting discussion see Katz, 2005. 
Direct Support of BS 
 Incentives to Innovative activities in SMEs and to Innovative SMEs (various possible 
functions and instruments) through Horizontal program or a mix between Horizontal and 
Targeted programs; 
 Adoption of a learning approach to program implementation. 
Indirect Support of the BS 
 A basic network of S/T/E institutions and organizations which could serve the needs 
both of BS innovation and of innovative SMEs (present and future). Depending on 
context it could include reform and adaptation of existing organizations. 
 Incentives to and institutional changes in support of the above network. Levels and 
rate of changes of support strongly dependent on initial conditions and specific context. 
Institutional reform and liberalization 
 Strongly dependent on context (e.g. gradual liberalization of foreign trade and capital 
movements; reforms in corporate governance, intellectual property, capital market 
regulations etc
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Explicit efforts at developing new policy capabilities would include actions such as 
assembling high capability teams of policy makers, academic consultants and stakeholders; 
undertaking search and research about policies implemented in other countries, their effectivness 
and how impact relates to context; and experiments (and learning) relevant for the new phase (Phase 
3) of targeted policy. Linked to these are additional actions explicitly directed to generate 
organizational routines and other capabilities (e.g. employing and training human capital) 
particularly for the Strategic ITP level.55 Israel’s experiments by private agents and Government 
which preceded VC targeting are one possible profile of this effort (see 5.3 below). The case of 
Chile is wholly different since a major policy capabilities’ role there was played by a private, non-
profit institution oriented to experimenting and targeting (Fundacion Chile). This institution 
generated a capability to adopt/adapt sophisticated foreign technology in part through sophisticated 
contracting and partnering with foreign technological suppliers. This has led both to the spinning 
out of new companies and to inducements for the creation of new sectors (e.g. Salmon farming, 
where Chile is a world leader). This activity is continuing at present and will undoubtedly 
contribute to Phase 2/3 policy capabilities of that country.56 
Box 6 
















                                                     
55  Major functions to be performed at this level are: identification of new Strategic Priorities, ascertaining the specific causes of SF (if it 
exists); and translating the outcome into a restructured country policy portfolio.  
56  Presentation by Dr. Bitran CEO of Fundación Chile, March 2004. 
 Horizontal and (gradually through time) Targeted support of Technological 
Infrastructure e.g. collaborative, generic R&D; Sector Specific Technological Centers; 
Mission-Oriented Generic Research programs and networks, etc. 
 Link Programs: University-Industry; Science-Technology; Technology-Innovation; 
Country-Major Foreign Partners/Markets. 
 Expansion of Direct Support of innovative SMEs: (while assuring non-
discrimination with respect to SMEs and positive orientation towards KBE); higher and 
increasing selectivity of Incentives in response to Collective Learning in Phase 1. 
 Specific programs directed to high tech or KBE e.g. Technological Incubators. 
 Creation of a Strategic Innovation Forum with the objective of setting new priorities 
and programs/policies for Phase 3. 
- Introduce policy evaluations and new mechanisms for the coordination of policies  
- Identification of the potential and conditions required for emergence of a VC/PE sector  
- Studies for the identification of other areas of potential SCA 
- Assuring a favorable environment and support for business experiments/learning about 
new areas/sectors 
- Identify areas of SCA which also have “Class A” market Forces (‘selection’) 
- Identification and stimulation of Key Agents 
- Identify alternative policy profiles for targeted support of selected areas 
- Experimental implementation of Targeted Programs in selected areas; possible 
participation of world class experts and actors in the relevant areas 
- Gradual building- up of Strategic ITP level routines and capabilities 
 Initiating Design and Tentative Implementation of Targeted Programs in a 
subset of such areas (towards ‘reproduction’).
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4.2.3 Phase 3: Acceleration of Innovation/Learning and      
 Transition  to a Knowledge-Based Economy 
Targeting during this phase should not be circumscribed to VC/PE*; it could, depending on 
context, be directed to specific sectors (specific High Tech or other sectors) or to other components 
of innovative clusters.57  
Box 7 

























4.3 Possible Variants to the Generic Model 
The model purports to be quite general in the sense that it allows a number of variants which 
reflect a) the particular conditions prevailing in different industrializing economies; and b) different 
evolutionary paths up to Phase 2 which imply different opportunities for Phase 3 policies. 
Moreover, in the Korean and Chilean cases a measure of overlap of phases would seem to be 
desirable. Let us be reminded that any support of innovative SMEs, of VC/PE, etc. must be 
accompanied by a measure of support of the S/E base (including high level training engineers and 
scientists). Differences in these complementary measures would also be reflected in different 
variants or variant classes. 
                                                     
57  This was not the Israel’s case during Phase 3. Lately we have seem a gradual movement towards targeting biotech (e.g. the Nofar 
sub-program of the Magnet Program) but nothing similar neither in scope nor in impact to the targeting of VC in the early 1990s. 
Targeted Programs 
 VC/PE* directed program aiming at Industry Emergence and/or creation of the 
relevant market (evolutionary selection and reproduction). 
 Directed to innovation-intensive sectors/clusters with potential SCA and with Class A 
market forces (evolutionary selection and reproduction). 
 Directed to generic, cooperative research in emerging technologies of relevance to 
existing or new sectors with PC. 
 Catalytic Support of Technological Infrastructures of wide significance e.g. broad 
band, etc. 
Widespread diffusion e.g. through Horizontal and/or targeted programs of 
R&D/‘innovation’ throughout the BS; and throughout the various regions of the country. This 
will include: 
 Downsized Horizontal support programs with greater emphasis on incentives’ 
selectivity. 
 (possibly) Broad Based Tax benefits to R&D performed in the BS; etc. 
Scanning and Searching the external and internal environment to identify further 
required changes in the National System of Innovation. 
Strong Development of the Science and Technology (S/E) Base aiming at generating 
a virtuous co-evolutionary process with the BS; and at enhancing international links in S/T. 
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Phase 1 
Variant 1A: Weak initial S/T Base and low (initial) numbers of Innovative SMEs 
In this case Phase 1 should start with a two pronged effort-substantial direct support to 
innovative SMEs; and a significant effort at upgrading the S/T Base. Within this general class of 
situations there could be significant differences among countries which would reflect the initial 
structure of the SME segment (technology level, industrial branch, size, etc.) and the broader policy 
and institutional structure. The implication would be different portfolios of Phase 1 policies 
reflecting different types of SF.  
Moreover, SME support may take different forms: support for technology transfer, and/or 
technology adaptation and learning; and/or training of personnel; and/or support of advisory and 
consultancy services; etc.. Differences may also be due to the instruments or support mechanisms 
used.58 A major task would be to identify a small set of policy profiles suitable to this Class of 
variants. 
Variant 1B: Strong S/T Base and large numbers of Innovative SMEs 
Some countries e.g. Russia already have a strong S/T Base which means that, when first 
implementing our model, the required complementary policies directed to the basic S/T/E 
infrastructure (including Universities) will have to be of a more restricted scope than those required 
without such a base e.g. Chile. Moreover an important part of the effort should be directed to adapt 
existing institutions to the market economy and Globalization contexts, including but not only 
towards higher levels of Business Orientation. If the country already has a pool of innovative SMEs 
and a strong culture supporting technological entrepreneurship it may even be possible to proceed 
directly to Phase 2 (alternatively, Phases 1 and 2 may overlap). 
Phase 2 
Variants 2A: Alternative types of Experimentation and of Agents involved 
Cases which illustrate alternative profiles include Israel (discussed above extensively and in 
A&T, 2004c); and Chile (briefly discussed above). 
Variants 2B: Scope of Explicit Efforts at Developing ‘Strategic ITP capabilities’ 
Explicit and extensive efforts (including creation of new formal institutions) where developed 
in Korea and in Finland (see above). This contrasts with Israel’s experiments and problem solving 
activities which led to the new ‘strategic priority’: emergence of a domestic VC industry. In Israel 
no explicit Strategic ITP Level routines were created in the early 1990s nor were there explicit 
investments in creating such a profile of policy capabilities which could serve the country’s future 
targeting needs.  
Phase 3 
Variant Classes 3A: Policy Led Emergence of VC/PE* industry 
This variant is likely to be relevant for countries where emergence of a VC/PE* industry is a 
strategic priority and were SF block the autonomous emergence of the industry. Some countries 
                                                     
58  In this paper we focus on subsidies or grants to innovation rather than other tools such as tax benefits -which have been found of 
doubtful value as promoters of R&D (see e.g. Metcalfe 1995 and Stoneman 1987); or loans (which could involve both high 
transactions costs and weak incentives for risky innovation. For our purposes subsidies/grants includes also ‘non-refundable loans’ 
(loans which are not returned if the innovation fails commercially) and royalty schemes (where the quid pro quo is royalties on sales 
from the innovation being subsidized). Probably the best case for tax benefits to R&D is in Phase 3 where the issue is ‘massification’ 
of an already quite well developed process of diffusion of R&D. 
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might benefit from VC/PE* industries developed elsewhere although at present it might still be 
difficult to develop a VC/PE market without an important domestic VC/PE industry component (see 
also 5.1 below).59 But this may change as VC industries of the US and other countries (including 
Israel) are increasingly becoming global. This means that in the future the focus in other countries 
might lie in the development of a domestic VC/PE market with a significant foreign supply 
component. For the time being the focus of this paper will be on development of a domestic VC 
industry (which does not of course exclude policies for bringing foreign VCs into the country as 
part of the overall process). Success will usually require other complementary incentives programs 
or other Government action. In Israel such policies were already implemented during Phase 2.60 
Other countries could distribute the complementary programs and actions between Phases 2 and 3. 
Another sources of variation is related to the nature and design of targeted policies. These 
may vary from country to country. In contrast to other VC directed policies prevailing at the time, 
Yozma included an explicit Government venture investment component whose function was 
twofold: a) provide incentives to the upside through a combination of Fund effect and a call option 
on the Government’s share; and b) to signal foreign investors that Israel was determined to develop 
its high tech and VC industries. In contrast to this, VC policies of other countries frequently 
involved tax concessions (e.g. on VC raised or VC investments) and Government guarantees 
without an explicit venture contribution; or if a Government venture contribution existed it took the 
form of a Government-owned VC company (see OECD reports on the subject). 
Variant Class 3B: Market Led Emergence of Domestic VC/PE* industry  
Alternatively Phase 3 may involve a market led process of emergence of VC/PE industries. 
This of course does not mean that policy is not important as the US example shows (AKT, 2005). 
What it means is that there might have been other high impact S/T/E policies which indirectly 
favored VC there; and that there was no targeted or major VC/PE directed policy.  
Variant 3C: Other Targeting 
Beyond targeting VC/PE some countries may target specific sectors during Phase 2, both 
non-high tech and high tech. A domestic VC industry and/or market may facilitate the process by 
reducing capital market imperfections, a major market failure justifying Government intervention in 
support of infant industries. This was not the case of Israel at least till the year 2000.61 Other 
countries may also target specific innovation-intensive sector e.g. wireless communications in 
Korea or Biotechnology in several European countries and Industrializing economies.  
                                                     
59  In both the Israeli and US cases the development of the local VC/PE industry coincided with the development of the local market. 
This is obvious for the innovator country (the US) but not so for Israel which is a follower country. It would seem that foreign 
VC/PE would be reluctant to come to many countries without suitable domestic VC/PE companies to partner with. Thus VC/PE 
industries may be characterized by an important ‘non-traded good’ feature with regard to as yet underdeveloped VC/PE export 
markets. Thus some domestic supply component may be required for the development of a domestic VC/PE market.  
60  These included expansion of the grants to R&D program; a Technological Incubators Program which promoted new SU entry; and a 
generic, cooperative R&D program (see Box 3). 
61  Although targeting of technologies did occur in the Military (especially during late Phase 1 and Phase 2) and this had a strong effect 
on civilian oriented high tech during Phase 3. 
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5. Conditions for Success in 
Implementing the Three Phase 
Model 
We consider three sets of conditions: necessary conditions for 
phase transitions; development of new ‘targeting’ policy capabilities in 
Phase 2; and appropriate context, timing and design of VC/PE* 
targeted policy. 
5.1 Phase Transitions: Necessary Condition 
A main issue is identifying the conditions under which the early 
phase of strong Government support of SME innovation and learning 
would create conditions for the subsequent emergence of a private VC/ 
PE* industry or innovative cluster more generally speaking during 
Phase 3. We suggest three necessary conditions: a) a minimum level of 
diffusion of innovation and associated capabilities throughout the BS, 
both the SME and other segments; b) emergence of ‘demand’ for the 
finance and other services provided by a VC/PE industry;62 and c) 
generation of a policy makers’ capability for undertaking ‘targeted’ 
policies. We here expand on the first two. 
A minimum of innovation capabilities (condition a) is required 
for the economy to be able to exploit the ongoing Technological 
Revolution and Globalization process which are opening large 
numbers of new technological and business opportunities; and in order
                                                     
62  This demand would originate in the innovative SME segment established during Phase 1 and 2 and as a result of new entrants. 
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to effectively access and exploit the constantly increasing global pool of knowledge and technology 
(A&T 2004a).63 Also the share of those capabilities which are enshrined in existing companies 
some of them large will enhance the potential pool of technological and KBEs that may be spinned-
off from such organizations. They may, like in the case of high tech in Israel during the 1980s and 
1990s and of India currently, be an important source of new innovative SMEs in the economy the 
impact of which could be strongly felt in subsequent phases. 
A sufficient level of pre-existing ‘demand’ for VC/PE* services (one which flows from the 
critical mass of innovative SMEs generated during phases 1 and 2) is an important if not critical 
facilitator of phase 3 policies in support of the creation of a VC/’PE* industry. Both Israel’s success 
and the failure of other countries’ attempts at developing VC or ‘venture’ PE industries in countries 
like Germany (Black and Gilson 1998, 1999; Hellman 2000), OECD countries (OECD 1996, 1997; 
2000) and Chile64 underlie the centrality of ‘deal flow’, ‘entrepreneurship’ or ‘mass of SU or 
innovative SMEs’ for the successful implementation of VC –or PE– directed policies (A&T 2005a). 
This need not sound as totally obvious since frequently radical or major innovations (and VC/PE 
could be considered as such in the ‘social technology’65 area for the economies in question) have 
led to the creation of new markets and industries supposedly without pre-existing demand. 
Moreover in principle a new domestic industry could be based on the export rather than the 
domestic market. So the issue is ‘what is distinctive in VC/PE which seems to foreclose such a 
situation’?  
In the VC (and to some extent the PE) area there are three major groups of reasons. First-
during VC emergence, the industry (to a large extent) produces a non-traded good i.e. VC services 
are difficult to export and to import. This means that a domestic industry requires a domestic market 
and vice-versa (this will gradually change with experience and maybe, with further deepening of the 
Globalization process). Second, market building may be slow and difficult and may fail. There are 
many examples of major/radical inventions which have anticipated their time or which have 
outright failed; only a subset of such inventions succeeded i.e managed to create a market. The third 
is a group of reasons related to the special characteristic of the global VC industry which is a 
cyclical industry (Avnimelech 2004). It follows that VC emergence has to proceed fast before the 
next crisis; and the chances that this will be the case are higher if there exists pre-existing demand.66 
Moreover by shortening the time and increasing the profitability of the first exits of the fledging VC 
industry, a strong pre-existing demand will assure, through a ‘reputation effect’ generated by 
successful exits, that a higher share of global resources of ‘intelligent’ VC will flow to the country 
in question. Finally, VC is a social technology a fact which is likely to impair its effective diffusion 
beyond the ‘inventor’ country (see Nelson, 2002). This ‘supply side’ constraint makes it even more 
important to effectively tackle the previous two factors by weakening the constraint on rapid VC 
emergence that originates on the ‘demand side’.67 
5.2 VC/PE Targeting: Timing, Context and Design 
The nature of effective targeted policies under the current Technological Revolution and 
trends in Globalization differ substantially from the policies actually implemented and analyzed 
some decades ago e.g. in the analysis of infant industry promotion in the International Trade 
                                                     
63  A constant flow (rather than a fixed set of) new technological opportunities is a pre-condition for emergence of a VC oriented to SUs 
whose function is to transform these opportunities into business opportunities (Kenney, World Bank Report 2003). Presumably this 
will also be the case in relation to PE and innovative SMEs.  
64  A Chilean Government program implemented in early in the present decade (personal communication). 
65  For the notion of ‘social technologies’ and the differences with physical technologies see Nelson 2002. 
66  Pre-existing demand is also important to initiate a process of ‘endogenous creation of demand’ by facilitating the initiation of a 
virtuous VC-SU co-evolutionary process. See A&T 2004a. 
67  The importance of the third group of reasons depends on context. Only some may be strongly relevant to non VC private, equity-
based infrastructures. 
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literature; and in the analysis of infant industry promotion in Brazil and Korea (see for example 
Westphal 1990 and Kim 1997). The framework of past research was not explicitly a S/E 
framework; and the context was one of either import substitution policies or strong protection of the 
domestic market (like in Korea). The latter provided a reasonable time frame for the infant 
industries promoted to exploit economies of scale and of learning. 
In the new context a major issue is to identify which industries or clusters should be 
targeted.68 Due to the dynamic environment and strong and increasing global competition the set of 
realistic options for any one country may be less clear than what it was for Japan in the 60s and 70s 
and for Korea ten years later.69 For this reason a strategic ITP process should be initiated which 
addresses the issue of how to identify areas with a potential SCA. Promotion of innovative SMEs is 
one aspect of this process of eventually identifying suitable candidates for targeting. This because 
the activity of these companies, especially if undertaken on a wide front, could lead to new 
innovative goods, product classes and even sectors (alternatively we could say that such SME’s 
undertake ‘experiments’ which could lead to subsets of areas with potential SCA). It should be 
noted here that the active agents of innovation emphasized here are not large firms such as those 
which spearheaded Japan’s (and Korea’s) post World War Two targeted industry development 
processes.70 
Once an industry/cluster to be targeted has been selected it will be important to rapidly build 
capabilities; and (global) market share. Only then will it be able to confront potential competition 
from new entrants; and to overcome the inevitable cycles which affect many sectors (e.g. VC/PE, 
semiconductors; traditional sectors, etc.).  
Lessons from Israel’s Experience 
There are lessons to be derived from the analysis of Israel’s targeted VC policies of 1993-
1997 both for VC policies of other countries and for ITP targeting in general. In previous work we 
strongly argued that program success was linked very closely to the context and timing of policies; 
to program design; to complementary policies and to conditions of implementation (see A&T 
2004b, 2005a, 2006b). 
The Timing of Policies 
Right timing was important due to both the internal and external environments of the country. 
The earlier the timing of the targeted policy the greater the risk that domestic demand (for the 
services of the future VC industry) would not have had enough time to build up to the level which, 
in conjunction with the policy-induced increases in ‘supply’, would trigger a cumulative process of 
VC emergence. On the other hand, the shorter the period between the initiation of such a process 
and the next downturn of the world VC industry (i.e. the later the targeted policy) the less the time 
period available for industry emergence and for a significant high tech impact to materialize.  
How Yozma Overcame the System Failure71 
A good ‘design’ of a targeted policy directed to a particular industry/cluster must ensure that 
the specific causes for the SF responsible for blocking emergence of the new industry, are 
                                                     
68  This was less of a problem for postwar Japan (and for Korea in the 1970s) than what it is nowadays. It however is less controversial 
with respect to the desirability of targeting VC/PE or related industries given its role of being a relatively ‘generic’ private support 
infrastructure for innovative SMEs.  
69  For a discussion of Japan’s experience see Komiza,1988. 
70  The emphasis on innovative SMEs’ role is not to exclude the important role that large firms might play in spurring innovation and 
growth. Rather the objective is to emphasize i) that in the present ‘entrepreneurial phase’ of the ICT revolution, entrepreneurship and 
innovative SMEs may be the source of new sectors with potential SCA; and ii) that they may also be the source of innovative large 
firms (i.e. some may grow very fast) as well. 
71  See also A&T 2005b, 2006b,d. 
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adequately addressed. Yozma’s design (and implementation) did in fact do the job for Israel’s VC 
industry and high tech cluster: each specific SF cause (SFj) was addressed by one or more design 
features and/or implementation solutions. The set of SFj and some instances how Yozma overcame 
them are shown below (for further details see A&T 2004c). 
• SF1: Difficulties in accessing intelligent and reputable foreign partners 
− Active search and interaction with highly qualified and reputable foreign VCs. 
− Sharing risk with private investors (government share in Yozma funds was 40%). 
− Upside incentive to private investors in Yozma funds (mostly attractive for highly 
skilled professional VC agents). 
• SF2: Assembling a Critical Mass of Capabilities 
− Required participation of professional foreign VC/PE companies in each Yozma funds 
(as LP). 
− Required participation of capable local agents (individual and institutions) as general 
and limited partners. 
− Selection of Yozma VC management company candidates according to their 
background and potential. 
• SF3: Critical Mass of Financial Resources 
− Direct government VC investment through Yozma Venture Fund ($20M); Government 
Fund of Fund investment ($80M) in 10 privately owned VC management companies 
(Yozma funds); It leveraged an additional $150M of private funds (foreign and local); 
The total of $250M was sufficient to trigger a cumulative emergence process. 
• SF4: Coordination 
− Involving Agents (domestic and foreign) on the one hand and Financial Capital on the 
other. 
− Intensive interactive prior to policy implementation: This involved Government 
officials, agents from Israel’s high tech and financial sectors; and individuals and 
organizations from abroad. 
− With other Policies. 
− Parallel implementation of complementary ITPs (expansion of R&D grants program, 
MAGNET program and Technological Incubator program). 
− Investment Coordination in early operation of Yozma Funds. 
− Participation of OCS representative in the board of Yozma Funds. 
• SF5: Selection of VC strategies consistent with strict definition of VC 
• SF6: Assuring Fast Learning 
• SF7: Country/Government Signaling 
• SF8: Selection of VC Characteristics 
It is clear that overcoming the SF facing Israeli Policy makers in the early 1990s required 
attention to be given to a) achieving fast a critical mass of highly qualified domestic VC managers 
that would be willing to enter the industry; b) idem with respect to world class foreign players who 
would be willing to partner with the Israeli ones; c) coordinating these two resources in an effective 
way and in a short period of time; d) signaling that Israel was serious about developing its VC and 
high tech industries (see 3.4 above); and e) promoting collective learning in the new 
industry/market.  
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Given the trends in Globalization and associated opportunities and threats for developing new 
innovative industries (a global market on the one hand, global competition on the other) these 
conditions seem to us to be of wider applicability. For example, the speed of emergence (and 
attaining rapidly a non-insignificant market share) could be a critical factor in the success of 
targeted policies directed to innovative infant industries, including high tech ones. Otherwise, new 
competitors might emerge which could considerably erode the benefits to be achieved domestically. 
Strong participation of foreign players in the infant industry may therefore be imperative in many 
cases e.g. to effectively and speedily access foreign markets; to engage in complex contracting 
(such as alliances) etc.. Since speedy market coordination may be unrealistic Government should 
take an active role in coordinating both domestic and sophisticated foreign agents. Moreover, 
effective coordination in this sphere cannot be separated from the provision of adequate incentives 
to both domestic and foreign players. This means that both sophisticated incentives and other 
important features (policy selection, signaling, coordination, etc.) must characterize targeted 
program design (Yozma’s incentives to the ‘upside’ are very suggestive about a possible means of 
attracting world class foreign players). 
5.3 Policy Capabilities and Virtuous ITP-business/SME co-evolution72 
The third necessary factor for a successful transition from Phase 1/2 to Phase 3 largely 
concerns the need of adopting a strategic view of ITP (see next section) and the related need to 
implement targeted policies. Targeted policies seem to be inherently more complex than horizontal 
policies and therefore require a longer and more complex preparatory period. There are clearly a 
priori reasons for this particularly in contexts with very little experience with innovation and ITP. 
Moreover, based on the comparison between the horizontal support to R&D which started in Phase 
1 and the successful targeted support of VC of Phase 3, this has been the case in Israel.  
A summary statement about this policy capabilities requirement is that the BS on the one 
hand and policy institutions and capabilities on the other should co-evolve (A&T, 2005a). This 
process is a specific instance of the co-evolutionary processes between technology, industry 
structure and institutions analyzed by Nelson (see Nelson, 1994).73 A condition for a virtuous co-
evolutionary process is that the BS experience of Phase 1 is brought to bear in policy decisions of 
subsequent phases thereby providing a justification to the Galli and Teubal assertion of some time 
ago that policy institutions are part of the national SI (see Galli and Teubal, 1997). The outcome 
would be a chain of successful ITP policies/ programs involving Phases 1-3 (see A&T, 2003b) 
which we may term ITP1, ITP2 and ITP3. To this sequence corresponds a chain of System/Market 
failures SF1, SF2 and SF3. Unlike SF1, SF2 and SF3 would be caused by policy rather than being 
the ‘cause’ of policy (Lipsey and Carlaw, 1997). 
Sustaining a virtuous business-ITP co-evolutionary process however also requires explicit 
investments in specific competences not directly related to past policy experience. The missing 
components are in part related to the experiments proposed for Phase 2 (oriented to obtain 
additional knowledge); and in part related to other investments e.g. in human capital. The additional 
‘knowledge’ concerns assessments about the economic potential of existing activities and resources; 
about current and expected changes in the environment facing the country or system (external and 
internal); and about implications for policy e.g. what new priorities should be aimed at and what are 
the associated SF. The ITP strategic level will include search oriented to the generation of new 
potential trajectories and opportunities for the system; and oriented to identify the specific causes of 
SF. These should be present at least at discrete intervals, throughout or increasingly throughout the 
process (they will become critical in Phase 2).  
                                                     
72  For additional details see A&T 2003b. 
73  For further discussions see 5.3 below. 
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In Israel both policy institutions and personalities played crucial roles in assuring a virtuous 
ITP-high tech/SU co-evolutionary process which covered Phases 1 and 2. The OCS which is a 
specialized institution devoted to supporting BS R&D and to the creation and support of high tech 
industries was specifically created to implement the R&D grants program; and through time it 
became the locus of new experienced-based capabilities. Moreover, the last Chief Scientist of phase 
2 (who identified the new system requirements enabling high tech SU to exploit the new 
opportunities opened up by globalization) was also the main actor behind the design of the Yozma 
Program. His success in identifying the new ‘SF’ would be impossible without the accumulated 
experience and knowledge of the OCS. Undoubtedly in other contexts there must be other profiles 
of virtuous business-policy co-evolution.74 
Further work on how to develop a strategic ITP level should follow a Dynamic Capabilities 
approach (Teece et al 1997 among others). The most promising approach in our opinion is that of 
Zollo and Winter 2002. A central issue is how their Organizational Knowledge Cycle which focuses 
on ‘operational learning’ and generation of Dynamic Capabilities related to operational routines 
could be adapted or linked with other perspectives in order to explain emergence of ITP strategic 
level capabilities and routines.75  
                                                     
74  By a virtuous ITP-High Tech co-evolutionary process we mean a chain of complex dynamic links where Government not only 
responds successfully to ‘current’ SF but indirectly (maybe somewhat unintentionally) is also instrumental in creating a ‘future’ SF to 
which it also responds successfully. The link between SF today and SF in the future is the process of business sector (in most cases, 
high tech) restructuring induced by the policy response, generally a new ITP program, to the current SF. A virtuous ITP-High Tech 
co-evolutionary process requires that the Government identify SF and craft an adequate policy response; and that business/high tech 
(and other components of the system) adapt, thus effectively canceling the constraint to growth represented by the original SF. It also 
requires that the new, restructured & more sophisticated high tech sector which emerges from this first round of policy making and 
policy impact be capable of exploiting a new set of opportunities that exogenously makes its appearance (provided a suitable policy 
response is found to a new System Failure that stands in its way). Israel’s experience suggests that a virtuous co-evolutionary process 
may require i) a specialized policy institution in charge of national ITP (like Israel’s OCS); ii) strong accumulation of ‘policy 
capabilities’ through time; and iii) a political process such that the aforementioned agency not be captured by private interests and 
lobbies. 
75  The new perspectives should focus on non-marginal changes (e.g. shift from operational to strategic routines); on other patterns of 
behavior which are not routines’ based; on the role of search and external information; and on high levels of ‘intentionality’ (in 
contrast to pure experience accumulation). 
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6. Conclusions and Future 
Challenges  
We have presented the outline of what may be an important 
category of dynamic, Systems-Evolutionary policy initiatives for 
industrializing economies in the area of innovative SME support and in 
the related area of VC, PE or other related PE-based finance and 
support infrastructures. Given the current ’entrepreneurial phase’ of 
the ICT Revolution, support of ‘Innovative SMEs’ should be one of 
the axes of an overall strategy of development for a large group of 
industrializing economies. These ITP initiatives are embedded within a 
three phase cycle framework, initially suggested by the Israeli 
experience. A major link connects the early (Phase 1) support of 
innovation in general and innovative SMEs in particular to the 
subsequent (Phase 3) emergence of innovative or high tech clusters 
and transition to a Knowledge-Based or Learning Economy. PE, VC or 
other equity-based private support systems would play important roles 
in the above transition. 
The strategic priorities of ITP and the SF to be overcome vary 
from phase to phase in our three phase model. In Phase 1, where a 
significant innovative SME segment may not exist, the objective is to 
diffuse innovation/R&D through the BS without discriminating SMEs, 
and in fact, positively favoring such enterprises. More frequently than 
not this requires direct Government policy in support of innovation in 
the BS. This support should be significant and consistent over time: 
rather than crowding out the possibility of developing a domestic VC 
industry and/or market it would contribute to create background and 
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pre-emergence conditions for the emergence of such a support system (A&T, 2006b). The tools 
used include an important component of Horizontal support schemes focusing on different functions 
associated with Innovation; and applying different instruments although there may be clear 
advantages to subsidies, grants or conditional loans over regular loans and tax benefits. In some 
countries like Russia in the 1990s and in Israel in the 1970s a strong pre-existing S/T/E ‘base’ 
makes direct support of innovation in the BS the main axis of support (although continued support 
of the ‘base’ will be required, possibly through continued implementation of existing mechanims of 
support). In other countries like Korea in the 1970s, Phase 1’s policy portfolio includes a strong 
component of support of the S/T/E base i.e. in variants such as these, the direct innovation support 
schemes must be accompanied by strong support of the ‘base’. 
Phase 3 involves the acceleration of innovation which frequently may include a strong formal 
BS R&D component. As mentioned, a major component at this stage is creation-through ‘targeting’ 
of a VC/PE or other related PE-based ‘innovative SME’ support infrastructure. The paper strongly 
suggests that a condition for the successful policy-led emergence of such private infrastructures or 
support industries is the prior development of sufficient ‘demand’. This would imply that the 
Innovation and Technology Policies implemented in Phases 1 and 2 must have succeeded in 
generating a significant ‘pool’ of innovative SMEs (those ‘demanding’ the services of the new 
infrastructures). Moreover, given the complexity of the ‘targeting’ requirement, a transition to 
Phase 3 requires new policy capabilities which in part have to be developed in Phase 2. These will 
enable Phase 3 formulation of an explicit strategy with new priorites which reflect the changed 
domestic circumstances (partly the result of past policies). The strategy will also partly reflect a 
consensual vision of the future configuration of the system of innovation, one which also takes into 
account the expected changes in external conditions. In Phase 2 it will be important to conduct 
experiments both at the level of the BS and at the level of the Government. BS experiments concern 
the new sectors to be developed in Phase 3 possibly including PE based innovative SME support 
systems and possibly other innovative or high tech sectors. An environment favourable to these 
experiments should be assured (e.g. enhanced liberalization and deregulation, some adaptation of 
tax and other institutional structures to international norms, etc.). Finally, it must be said that in 
many contexts and beyond the experiments mentioned above, it would be desirable to develop new 
‘strategic’ ITP ‘routines’ and ‘capabilities. These together with the above experiments and the 
policy experience from Phase 1 will enable the Government to identify and select sectors with 
potential long run competitive advantage. Phase 3 targeting will focus on a subset of such sectors. 
Implications 
From a S/E perspective, the ITP framework proposed could be considered a Cluster Creation 
Policy framework. Moreover, as suggested by the Israeli experience and due to the processes of 
Globalization, VC and/or PE and/or other private, equity-based infrastructures could play important 
dynamic roles in the emergence of new innovative clusters (high tech or non-high tech) or in the 
adaptation and re-configuration of existing ones. In our three phase model targeting such private 
infrastructure segments or industries is a central component of Phase 3 which is also characterized 
by a significant increase in the share of R&D (or innovative effort) in GNP.  
The above is pertinent to the adaptation and development of SME intensive clusters in Latin 
America. The strategic priority of ‘generating an important and growing segment of innovative 
SMEs’ which characterizes our three phase model and which also plays an important role in the 
literature (e.g. of P&R, 2004) may very well require an ITP cycle phase which focuses on the 
generation of new and private, equity-based finance and support systems for such companies. The 
implied cluster re-configuration will go beyond that contemplated in the above paper and even 
beyond R. Sabel’s recommendation for Italian Clusters.76 What is needed is a new set of highly 
                                                     
76  Lead lecture at a clusters conference held at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, September 2003. 
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capable independent agents with strong motivation, capabilities and power to support, in a 
distributed capabilities mode, the process of international expansion and functional upgrading of 
innovative SMEs. 
The new equity-based finance and support mechanisms generate a new variant of the market-
based and/or network based GVC so much emphasized in the analyses of Latin America, one which 
could substitute for existing hierarchical or quasi-hierarchical types. It is based on partnering 
innovative SMEs with other external private loci of complementary capabilities and power, based 
on a clear incentives alignment and on a common interest of fully exploiting the opportunities 
opened up by Globalization and the Technological Revolutions. Such ‘partnership’ would create 
new degrees of freedom to innovative SMEs and reduce their dependence on foreign buyers and 
importers. It could lead to the de-construction of existing GVC and their substitution by others, 
including those oriented to new global markets for intermediate inputs. If successful the two sets of 
agents would eventually co-evolve and generate a cumulative process of cluster growth.  
Another important aspect of Phase 3 (and Phase 2) policies could be summarized by the term 
‘Evolutionary Targeting’, to contrast to the targeting supposedly undertaken by post WWII Japan 
and by Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. Evolutionary targeting involves a number of crucial steps. 
These include-creation of ‘background contitions’ for the future (Phase 3) emergence of equity-
based private support systems for innovative SMEs; systematic ‘search’ for areas/industries 
(beyond the private support systems) who potentially could enjoy a SCA; experiments about 
possible configurations of the subset of ‘selected’ areas/industries (private support systems and 
others); and identification of possible SF. All or most of these should take place in Phase 2, prior to 
the massive targeting to be undertaken in Phase 3. Moreover, the ‘industry emergence’ oriented 
targeted policies should be implemented at the right time and within an appropriate context; their 
design should consider not only incentives but also capabilities, issues of organization and critical 
mass, the possible collaboration of foreign partners, complex coordination needs, country signaling 
issues, etc.. Last but not least, the implementation of a targeted program should assure the 
institutional set up and coordination required to prompt a strong process of collective learning. This 
tall order would assure a cumulative process of emergence of new private infrastructures and 
industries. 
Limitations of the Analysis 
It would be presumptuous to assume that any model, much more this one which purports to 
be of ‘generic’ value, could provide a high impact recipee for ITP in all cases. Our model has 
ignored some important aspects of the real contexts facing industrializing economies. I will mention 
two: the link with Macroeconomic Conditions and Policies; and a deeper analysis of the 
Institutional Context. 
Macroeconomic conditions and polices both influence the ‘needs’ or ‘objectives’ of ITP 
policy as well as the resources available to implement them. The restrictions imposed by the Macro 
environment in Latin America have been pointed out by Kosacoff 2000, Cimoli and Katz 2003; and 
P&R 2004. A more positive example is that of Israel’s OCS which, during the macroeconomic 
instability of the mid 1980s, aided enterprises and their efforts to minimize loss of capabilities. A 
second weakness is the under-specification of the relevant institutional environment, which includes 
not only that underlying innovation and technology (e.g. patent laws) but also the BS as a whole 
(e.g. corporate governance, capital market regulations, communications’ regulation, bankrupcy laws 
etc.) and even society e.g. norms of behaviour, entrepreneurship, personal and social networks, etc. 
(see e.g. Kuznetsov 2003, 2004). Both of these weaknesses underscore even more the objective of 
this paper: it is not oriented to generate policy recipes. Rather the objective is to underscore some 
general principles (with illustrations) of what policies could be and of how to go about to generate 
truly context-specific ones. A deep understanding of the local macroeconomic and institutional 
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context –including the possibility of change– which goes much beyond the content of this paper is 
critical for the successful design and implementation of high-impact ITP. 
The Challenge: A Policy Role for Evolutionary/ Schumpeterian 
Social Scientists  
Our paper is predicated on the assumption that Evolutionary and Systems of Innovation 
theory can be fruitfully applied to the study of ITP for industrializing economies. Rather than taking 
a minimalist position of how such theories relate to policy we assume an integrated view. Under this 
view it is not enough that economists or social scientists provide policy makers knowledge about 
the ‘positive’ implications of different policy actions; they should also interact with them and 
provide knowledge relevant to the identification and characterization of System and Market failures 
(and associated ‘strategic priorities’). Moreover, they could contribute to generate a framework of 
analysis or platform for the design of policies that might overcome such failures. This view is 
consistent with the basic tenets of Evolutionary and Systems of Innovation theory since there, as in 
this paper, interactions are a critical component of the operation and transformation of Innovation 
Systems (in this case interactions between policy makers, the business community and academics 
with specialized knowledge). Another commonality between a S/E perspective and our integrated 
view of policy is the focus on dynamic processes e.g. the interactive policy process that should 
precede major strategic initiatives. Needless to say that playing this role is difficult since it strays 
from the conventional position of both neoclassical and evolutionary economists, one that implicitly 
seems to assume that policy is simply a trivial application of knowledge about the world. It also 
explains why this paper is essentially a non-mathematical instance of what in evolutionary parlance 
is termed ‘formal theory’, one which is supposed to set the stage for broader and systematic 
empirical analysis leading to context-related ‘appreciative theory’. Thus while the researcher might 
be intimately convinced about the ‘usefulness’ of our approach it should be clear to him that the 
research trajectory leading to the creation of methodologically acceptable ‘knowledge’ in the field 
is a long and tortuous one. 
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